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A comparative perspective of the liberalisation of the gas market and 
the effects on welfare: Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands 
 
Geerte Hesen
*
 
Abstract 
 
Gas Directive (2003) stipulates that all consumers must be free to choose 
their gas supplier by July 2007. The liberalisation of the gas market 
contributes to the establishment of a competitive internal market. In general, 
the liberalisation process is aimed at increasing welfare, in particular 
consumer welfare. Most of the literature relating to the liberalisation of the 
gas market is, however, primarily concerned either with the general 
economic notions of liberalisation and welfare, or with the specific legal 
aspects of the Gas Directive (2003). This paper takes an interdisciplinary 
and novel approach: both the legal and economic ramifications of the Gas 
Directive (2003) are examined. More specifically, this paper reviews the 
main legal obligations emanating from the Gas Directive (2003) and 
examines their effect on (consumer) welfare in three Member States: 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Full liberalisation was achieved in 
the three Member States by July 2004, but the positive effects of 
liberalisation are predominantly evident in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The current structure of the German gas market seems to impede 
competition. 
 
Keywords: gas market, regulation, welfare, internal market
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1 Introduction 
The creation of a European Community is based upon the establishment of a 
common internal market in which goods, services and persons are able to 
move freely between the different Member States (Article 2 EC Treaty). 
Gradually, European legislation in diverse areas has led to European 
harmonisation between the Member States. Unrestricted intra-state trade 
proceeds from an open and liberalised market driven by competitive market 
forces. Such liberalised markets will increase the total welfare of the 
European Community, in particular the consumer welfare. 
 
One sector within the EU which has however, remained regulated over the 
past few years (thereby restricting competition between Member States), is 
the energy sector, more specifically in the light of this paper, the gas sector. 
The continued regulation of the gas sector has been justified by the specific 
network characteristics of the sector, such as natural monopolies and large 
specific investments, which according to public economic theory, 
necessarily imply regulation. Over the past few years technological 
 6 
development has changed the structure of the gas market. As a result, parts 
of the market have actually become suitable for competition and hence 
liberalisation. Proponents of liberalisation argue that the former monopolists 
are inefficient, restricting the correct functioning of the market mechanism. 
Monopoly gains are reaped by incumbents and monopolists have no 
incentive to produce, distribute or market gas in a cost efficient manner, to 
the detriment of consumers. 
 
In order to reply to the call for liberalisation, the Commission has, in 1998, 
after numerous years of negotiations, finally issued EC Gas Directive 1998
1
. 
The Gas Directive 1998 has recently been amended by Gas Directive 2003
2
. 
The directives are aimed at the gradual liberalisation of the European gas 
markets and accordingly the introduction of competition in parts of these 
markets. Both directives contain provisions based on particular ideas of how 
competition is best achieved and hence introduced in markets. It is however, 
not clear if these directives will truly be able to introduce competition and 
accordingly increase consumer welfare (the benefits of liberalisation must 
accrue directly to consumers). 
 
At the time of writing, not much literature is available on the liberalisation 
of the gas market. The literature which is available is in generally concerned 
with the scope of the EC Gas Directive 1998 and is not up to date. In 
addition, this literature is primarily concerned with the legal aspects of 
liberalisation, more in particular the Gas Directive 1998. It would be 
interesting however, to also approach and assess the effectiveness of the 
liberalisation process from an economic point of view, more specifically 
from a welfare theory perspective. In addition, it is interesting to assess how 
the different existent market structures in three Member States, namely 
Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium respond to the process of 
                                                 
1
 Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas, Official Journal L 204, 
21/07/1998 P. 0001 - 0012. 
2
 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
98/30/EC, Official Journal L 176, 15/07/2003 P. 0057 - 0078. 
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liberalisation and to which amount the liberalisation within these markets is 
able to achieve the desired welfare effects. More specifically the research 
question of this paper may be formulated as follows: 
 
Can the European process of liberalisation of the gas markets be deemed 
successful, in particular in achieving the desired effects on consumer 
welfare?  
 
The paper will focus on three Member States, namely (as already 
mentioned): Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium. 
 
The paper will first discuss the economic theory on (de)regulation and the 
corresponding theory on markets and welfare standards (Chapter 2). In the 
third chapter, the general European legislative framework which must 
secure liberalisation of the markets will be reviewed. Chapter four is 
concerned with European Energy policy leading to the liberalisation 
process. Chapter five in particular discusses the content of the European gas 
market legislation, more specifically the EC Gas Directive 1998 and 2003. 
Chapter six and seven address the state of implementation of the directives, 
and the corresponding welfare effects of liberalisation, in the different 
Member States namely: Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands. The paper 
is closed with a conclusion. 
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2 Economic theory and (de)regulation 
Article 14 EC Treaty articulates the desire of the Community to establish a 
competitive internal market, in which barriers to trade are abolished, and the 
free movement of goods and services is assured. The creation of an internal 
market is based upon the premise that “the market is the best means to 
efficiently allocate resources, to integrate economies of the Member States 
and to promote sustainable and non-inflationary growth.”
3,4
 In this context, 
the market resembles a competitive economy in which market forces 
determine socially optimal output
5
 which is produced at minimum resource 
cost. In such societies, the economic activities of undertakings increase 
economic development and therefore consumer welfare. Even though the 
Commission recognizes that a competitive market generally produces better 
quality services and goods at lower prices, the market mechanism has its 
limits. In certain situations, gains from trade are not exhausted and total 
surplus is not maximized. As such, the potential benefits do not extend to 
the entire population and the objective of promoting social and territorial 
cohesion is not achieved.
6
 In the case of such market failure, governmental 
intervention might be justified in order to induce efficient market 
outcomes.
7
 Elements which may indicate market failure and justify 
regulation are 1) natural monopolies and 2) large sunk / specific 
investments. 
                                                 
3
 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper: For a European Union Energy 
policy, COM(94) 659, 23.02.1995, p. 97. 
4
 When economists refer to a (perfectly) competitive market, such a market is based upon 
four basic assumptions: 1) the economies of scale are small and relative to the size of the 
market; 2) output is homogeneous; 3) information is perfect and 4) there are no entry or exit 
barriers. In such markets, the market equilibrium is reached when price is equal to marginal 
cost. 
5
 Socially optimal output refers to the competitive equilibrium output which maximizes 
total surplus (the sum of consumer and producer surplus) and thus is Pareto optimal. An 
outcome is Pareto optimal if it is not possible to make one person better off without making 
another person worse off. 
6
 Cseres, K.J. (2004), Competition law and consumer protection: a love-hate relationship, 
Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit Utrecht. 
7
Market failure is the public interest explanation for regulation and plays a central role in 
this paper. Additionally, economic theories of regulation are based upon the premise that 
regulatory intervention allows certain groups to benefit from the redistribution of income 
and wealth and that the political process induces governments and politicians to regulate 
(Church, J., Ware, R. (2000), Industrial organization, a strategic approach, Boston: Irwin 
McGraw-Hill). 
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2.1 Market failure and regulation 
In perfectly competitive markets, the price is equal to marginal cost at the 
minimum of the long-run average cost function. At this equilibrium, the 
efficient level of output is produced (allocative efficiency)
8
 at minimum 
opportunity cost (cost or productive efficiency)
9
. At industry level, a cost 
efficient equilibrium indicates that the number and size distribution of firms 
is such that average cost for industry output is minimized. Market failure 
will occur if competitive market forces fail to bring about a socially 
desirable outcome, due to the fact that the minimisation of production costs 
requires production buy a single firm (natural monopoly). More specifically, 
a natural monopoly exists if the cost function is sub additive (featuring 
economies of scope), which means that any distribution of an output level q 
among N firms results in greater industry costs than if q is produced by a 
single firm (N=1). In a natural monopoly, entry by more than one firm will 
thus be inefficient. In addition, a natural monopoly is often characterised by 
substantial economies of scale (unit costs decrease sharply with volume). In 
order to avoid allocative inefficiencies, a natural monopoly may thus justify 
price and entry controls (regulation).
10
 
 
Regulation however, may also be called for when there is uncertainty and 
asymmetry of information and service provision is efficiently provided by 
making large investments in durable specific assets
11
. In such 
circumstances, regulation minimizes transaction costs
12
, and acts as an 
efficient mechanism to address opportunistic behaviour on the part of the 
                                                 
8
 More specifically, allocative efficiency occurs when resources are allocated in such a 
manner that the goods and services produced are those most highly valued by the 
consumers.  
9
 More specifically, productive/cost efficiency is achieved when the products are produced 
at lowest possible cost using a minimum of resources under the existing technology. 
10
 The conclusion that a natural monopoly warrants regulation has been challenged by 
various authors, see amongst others Demsetz, H. (1968), Why regulate utilities?, Journal of 
Law and Economics 11, p. 55-65, concerning the auction of a monopoly franchise; Church, 
J., Ware, R. (2000), Industrial organization, a strategic approach, Boston: Irwin McGraw-
Hill, p. 764, on the contestability of the market, and Braeutigam, R. (1979), Optimal pricing 
with intermodal competition, American Economic Review 69, p. 38-49. 
11
 Transaction specific assets mostly resemble sunk investments and have a very low value 
in their next-best alternative use. 
12
 Transaction costs incorporate the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract 
for each transaction and the cost of discovering relevant market prices (Williamson, O.E. 
(1996), The mechanisms of governance, New York: Oxford University Press.). 
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consumers and firms. Opportunistic behaviour refers to the fact that human 
agents will act in their own interest, and thus exhibit conduct contrary to the 
other party’s reasonable expectations. Such conduct is aimed at the 
expropriation of the quasi-rents
13
 or capital investment(s) of the other party. 
Opportunistic behaviour increases the transactions costs and thereby raises 
the incompleteness
14
 of contracts, and creates the following inefficiencies: 
1) increased cost of contracting; 2) costly renegotiation; 3) costs associated 
with hold-ups; 4) unexploited gains from trade due to inflexibility; 5) 
second sourcing; 6) underinvestment in specific assets.
15
 Such inefficiencies 
may warrant regulatory intervention, as illustrated more clearly with the 
following example. 
 
An example of a market in which the above inefficiencies occur, is the gas 
market.
16
 The construction of gas pipelines construes a considerable sunk 
specific investment. Moreover, producers of natural gas, distribution 
companies and consumers must make sunk investments themselves in order 
to produce, distribute or consume natural gas. If pipeline owners raise their 
prices (tolls) before producers have made their investments, they will limit 
development of the gas field. Producers are only willing to invest in the 
development of a gas field if the average total cost of development exceeds 
the difference between the tolls they pay and the prices they receive for their 
gas (netback). Once the field has been developed, producers will continue to 
exploit the gas field if the average variable cost exceeds the netback. The 
large sunk capital investment creates a large discrepancy between the 
average total cost and the average variable cost. Pipeline owners can 
expropriate the investment of producers by raising their tolls after the 
producers have made their investments (opportunistic behaviour). The 
ability of the pipeline owners to expropriate is negatively correlated to the 
                                                 
13
 Quasi rents are the difference between the cost of an asset and its salvage value (value in 
its present use and its next best alternative use or opportunity cost). 
14
 Incomplete contracts indicate that ex ante not all future contingencies can be accounted 
for in a contract (see Williamson, O.E. (1996), The mechanisms of governance, New York: 
Oxford University Press.). 
15
 Church, J., Ware, R. (2000), Industrial organization, a strategic approach, Boston: Irwin 
McGraw-Hill, p. 926. 
16
 The example is taken from Church, J., Ware, R. (2000), Industrial organization, a 
strategic approach, Boston: Irwin McGraw-Hill, p. 767. 
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alternative means of gas transportation. If producers cannot mitigate this 
opportunistic behaviour, they will under-invest or not invest at all (hold-up 
behaviour). However, the incentive for opportunistic behaviour is likely to 
be symmetric, as the success of a pipeline depends on throughput. Producers 
can threaten to delay development or refrain from investing at all, once the 
pipeline has sunk its costs into the ground. The pipeline owner will agree to 
any toll that exceeds its variable costs rather than have no throughput at all. 
In reaction to this risk, the pipeline owner will reduce its level of 
investment, or demand complicated contracts, or both. A solution to the 
display of opportunistic behaviour and the hold-up problem is regulation. 
Regulation may mitigate the inefficiencies associated with private contracts. 
Goldberg (1976) observes that intervention by regulation creates an 
administered contract: the regulator administers the relationship between the 
firm and the consumer through an institutional framework. As such, the 
regulator may control entry to the market by granting firms exclusive rights 
in exchange for an obligation to provide services. Such Public Service 
Obligations (PSOs), reduce the ability to refuse supply. In addition, the 
regulator may control prices (tolls) and as such allow prices to adapt in a 
cost-effective manner and reduce the costs of incomplete contracts.  
2.1.1 Network industries 
Markets that are characterised by large sunk investments and which qualify 
(in part) as natural monopolies are network industries such as natural gas, 
electricity and telecommunications. The elements of natural monopoly and 
large capital investment have - in the past - motivated the introduction of 
regulation. Such government intervention is driven by four dimensions: 1) 
the provision of a legal framework that enables efficient and reliable 
enforcement of private contracts; 2) substitution for missing private 
contracts; 3) the existence of network facilities raise concerns with regard to 
the efficient functioning of the markets, regardless of antitrust enforcement; 
 12 
4) redistribution may induce the State to depart from pure economic 
efficiency.
17
 
 
In its simplest economic definition, a network may be defined as a set of 
nodes and interconnecting lines between the nodes, organised within the 
object of transporting a flow of energy, material or information.
18
 Each node 
can be characterised as an originating node (point from which the flow is 
emitted), terminating node (the node which receives the flow) or 
intermediary node (such a node may incorporate the transmission, storage, 
dispatching, coordination etc.). Networks may be one-way such as gas, or 
two-way, such as transportation systems or telephone networks. Given the 
flows to be emitted, the best network is the one that minimises total costs. 
The identification of the final points of the network may be exogenous or 
endogenous depending on the nature of the transported flow. For storable 
products such as gas, the consumer can choose between a connection to the 
distribution network or the purchase gas cylinders. In addition, the design of 
the network depends upon the type of good transported. For standardised 
goods such as gas,  the destination of the good is not important once it has 
been injected into the network, as units are perfectly substitutable. The path 
which the units follows is however, largely controlled by the operators. In 
most networks goods have a tendency to take the path of least resistance 
(Kirchhoff law). In networks with a low circulation level (e.g., gas, water) 
the path can be controlled by switching the commutation nodes on and off.
19
 
 
Network utilities, are public utilities which require a fixed network to 
deliver their services, as such linking upstream supply with downstream 
customers.
20
 The network structure is costly to establish and thus embodies 
large fixed costs, implying relatively lower average production costs for 
large scale production. The network infrastructure may form an essential 
                                                 
17
 European Economy (1999), Reports and Studies: Liberalisation of the network industries, 
economic implications and policies, no 4, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, p. 70-71. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Newbery, D.M. (1997), Privatisation and liberalisation of network utilities, European 
Economic Review 41. 
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input to competitive service providers and thus be qualified as an essential 
facility. In such network industries, the construction of a parallel network is 
not possible because of the enormous cost of these investments. Natural 
monopolies form a part of the network industries.
21
 When the monopoly 
remains unregulated, this may give rise to market foreclosure issues, where 
foreclosure refers to “any dominant firm’s practice that denies proper access 
to an essential input, with the intent of extending monopoly power from one 
segment of the market (bottleneck segment) to the other (potentially 
competitive segment).”
22
 Such foreclosure can be complete (refusal to deal) 
or partial (the incumbent favours certain downstream firms, generally its 
own subsidiaries). The natural monopolies are however, dependent upon 
technological progress in the specific sector and in other sectors
23
; 
technological change alters the state of the natural monopoly. Technological 
change may thus for example, allow competition to be introduced in certain 
areas of production, which were previously reserved for incumbents. In the 
gas industry for example, the introduction of new technologies in electricity 
generation, more specifically gas generating units and cogeneration, has 
affected the structure of the industry by reducing the minimum efficient 
scale of generating units.
24
 
 
Network industries often deliver goods or services which are of importance 
to the general public and the business sector. Some of these goods or 
services are qualified as basic needs to which everyone should have access. 
As a consequence, public services obligations (PSO)
25
 have been 
introduced, which require network industries to provide services even when 
it is not economically profitable.
26
 The PSOs may take on various forms: 
provisions of a minimal service or minimal quality at reasonable price, tariff 
per equation etc. The PSOs may be financed in various ways: through 
internal cross-subsidies between an incumbent's products, through access 
                                                 
21
 Supra n. 17, p. 73. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Natural monopolies may also depend on demand conditions. 
24
 Supra n. 17, p. 67-68. 
25
 Also referred to in the literature as Universal Service Obligations (USOs). 
26
 Slot, P-J., Competition and Public Service Obligations: the example of the energy sector 
in Gormley, L. (ed.) (1997), Current and future perspectives on EC competition law, 
London: Kluwer Law International. 
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charges, through subsidies from a public service fund, or by awarding the 
incumbent a monopoly position. Compared with other network industries 
such as telecommunications, postal services and electricity, the gas industry 
seems to have relatively few PSOs.  
 
Network industries make up more than 6% of European GDP and 
employment.
27
 These industries are thus important for European growth and 
the competitiveness, and are essential to the functioning of the internal 
market. Network industries share common characteristics, such as the 
existence of natural monopolies, the dominance of incumbents, PSOs, etc. 
However, amongst the diverse Member States, network industries are 
organised quite differently according to three different categories: 1) 
centralisation/decentralisation; 2) vertical integration/separation; 3) 
private/public ownership.
28
 
 
A more specific example of a network industry is the gas market. 
2.1.1.1 Gas market 
Natural gas has important environmental advantages as a primary fuel over 
other hydrocarbon sources, and consumption is increasing substantially. The 
gas sector is a grid-based industry. The gas industry can be characterised as 
a one-way network where the transport infrastructure is the critical element 
(essential facility). In this network structure, the transportation system or 
gas transmission system (pipeline network, power grid), resembles the 
interconnecting line between the nodes. The transportation of gas depends 
on the availability of transmission grids.
29
 However, in the gas sector, the 
interoperability of networks is frustrated due to the differences in quality 
and other technical specifications of the network. In addition, the capacity of 
the interconnectors might be insufficient for the expected increase in the gas 
trade caused by liberalisation. 
 
                                                 
27
 Supra n. 17, p. 21. 
28
 Ibid., p. 24. 
29
 Supra n. 26. 
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The transportation system may be characterised as a natural monopoly in 
two aspects. Firstly, the construction of the system entails large sunk costs 
rendering duplication costly. Due to the large capital costs, pipeline costs 
are not directly related to throughput.
30
 Second, in order to establish an 
efficient allocation of resources and system security, centralised operations 
are essential. Due to the fact that the infrastructure required for the 
transmission of gas is a natural monopoly (the network is owned and 
exploited by one firm), the industry has been heavily regulated or operated 
by single state-owned undertakings. The need for security of supply tends to 
reinforce the justification for government regulation, subsidies and the grant 
of exclusive rights. The security of supply depends on the ability to ensure 
that internal resources can meet the essential energy needs together with 
accessible stable external sources, supplemented as appropriate by stocks. 
Due to the fact that natural gas reserves are located only in certain member 
states, the transportation (pipelines), security of supply and dependence on 
imports are significant. These factors have tended to reinforce national 
monopolies with public distribution and transmission undertakings granted 
exclusive operating rights. Over the past decade however, technological 
change has made it possible to deregulate certain parts of these markets, 
opening them up to competition.  
 
The supply side (upstream) of the gas market consists of gas producers and 
power generators, and is potentially competitive. The efficiency gains of 
increased competition in gas production will however be limited as there are 
only a limited number of producers (main producers: The Netherlands, 
Norway, Russia, Algeria) and in practice no newcomers will enter the 
market, unless significant new gas fields are discovered. Demand is 
articulated by distribution companies (downstream market) and industrial 
users, whose quantity demanded may fluctuate on a daily, weekly or 
monthly basis. In addition, gas demand is heterogeneous: whilst some 
corporations require a constant flow of gas, others don’t mind 
interruptability. Due to the fact that demand exhibits a seasonal pattern, 
                                                 
30
 Supra n. 17. 
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suppliers are confronted with a demand management problem. Seasonal 
fluctuations are not easily matched by producers (regardless of the seasonal 
storage facilities) and demand causes aggregate uncertainty. In order to 
satisfy demand, gas may be stored with the help of two types of facilities: 
seasonal storage facilities and emergency back-up storage facilities. Such 
facilities have a cost-reducing or efficiency enhancing effect on the 
production process. Although the storage of gas is potentially competitive, 
geographical or historical conditions may make existing storage an essential 
facility to which suppliers must have access in order to compete effectively. 
In contrast, storage facilities which are intended to smooth daily peaks and 
meet emergency requirements are often an integral part of the transportation 
system. These storage facilities substitute for pipeline and compressor 
capacity and cannot easily be unbundled from the transportation services. 
With the help of such storage facilities the pipeline operator can maintain 
system balance without the need to depend on suppliers for extra input.  
 
FIGURE OF GAS INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the capital of the network utility is large and sunk, once it has been 
created, the balance of the bargaining advantage shifts from the investor to 
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owner potentially large exploitative power. There is thus a need to devise an 
institution that will balance these interests and powers. 
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The gas Market is structured by horizontal and vertical demarcation
31
, a 
situation which is partly created by the long-term supply contracts signed 
between members of the vertical supply chain, from gas producers to end-
users. Vertical demarcation means that each operator holds a well-defined 
function and place in the supply chain and generally refrains from entering 
markets of its customers and or suppliers (e.g. no direct sales by producers 
to end-users). Horizontal demarcation means that each importer/wholesaler 
and or regional/local distributor has its traditional supply area and generally 
does not enter into the neighbouring supply area. Furthermore, most 
upstream markets (exploration) are characterised by cooperation between 
competitors, whilst most downstream markets (distribution and storage) 
appear to be dominated by national champions. 
2.2 Deregulation in network industries 
Before 1984, it was accepted that network utilities of gas, telecoms and 
electricity should be organised as vertically integrated monopolies centred 
on and justified by the natural monopoly of the network.
32
 The last twenty 
years have however, been characterised by substantial deregulation. Some 
industries have been essentially deregulated, while others have only been 
partially deregulated requiring restructuring of the industry and a regulatory 
regime. Due to technological change, network industries such as natural gas, 
electricity and telecommunications remain characterised by natural 
monopolies in certain stages of production (usually the network 
infrastructure due to the exorbitant duplication costs), but competition has 
been introduced in other stages of production. The stages of production 
which are potentially competitive require entrants to have access to 
complementary inputs produced by the incumbent monopolist. These 
complementary inputs can be provided through access to the network. Due 
to the characteristics of network industries, liberalisation has meant that the 
network infrastructure remains regulated whilst other parts of the industry 
must comply with the competition rules. 
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2.2.1 Constraints with respect to liberalisation 
Liberalisation however, does not automatically ensure fully competitive 
markets.
 
The incumbent monopolist will generally remain dominant during 
the initial phase of market opening as the incumbent alone has access to the 
network and/or a substantial amount of market power. In addition, the 
incumbent is often vertically integrated, e.g. in the gas market, pipeline 
owners have often extended their activities to the sale of gas.
33
 In light of 
the above, a specific issue of liberalisation concerns the monopoly segment: 
should operators divest themselves and if so, should there be lines-of-
business restrictions, or should they remain vertically integrated? Certain 
actions are indeed prescribed in order to render network markets 
competitive, usually competition rules are applied and/or some form of ex 
ante regulation is enforced. These actions should pursue two objectives: 1) 
ensure that new operators have non-discriminatory access to the network 
and to other essential facilities controlled by the incumbent and 2) prevent 
incumbents from applying cross-subsidies which might distort 
competition.
34
 
2.2.1.1 Non-discriminatory access 
As the incumbent has substantial market power, the regulator should create 
a temporary constraint on this market power in order to enable competitors 
to enter and develop within the market. The vertical structure of the 
incumbent may lead to tying and discriminatory access. The effects of tying 
are twofold: the price in the unregulated market is raised above marginal 
cost and if the incumbent is an inefficient producer of the product in the 
unregulated market, this will lead to the exclusion or reduction of the market 
share of more efficient firms. In this light, the incumbent may be required to 
divest certain assets, which will automatically lead to the creation of 
competitors. In addition, the incumbent monopolist is often required to 
                                                 
33
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unbundle its services, in other words, the monopolist must separate its 
merchant and transportation functions and price them individually. As such, 
this separation will provide consumers access to the incumbent’s 
distribution system, but leave them the choice over which retail services 
they wish to purchase and who will provide the services. In order to prevent 
discrimination by the incumbent concerning access and access prices, 
regulators should introduce mandatory non-discriminatory access and aim to 
regulate the prices of network access. Some authors argue that even without 
such regulatory intervention, operators will be able to gain access to the 
network on the basis of the EU competition rules, more specifically the 
doctrine of essential facilities.
35
 According to this doctrine, a dominant 
operator that owns an essential network should grant access to third parties 
on pain of breaching Article 82 of the EC Treaty.
36
 However, as Geradin 
(2000) states “The possibility of operators having recourse to the essential 
facilities doctrine to be granted access does not deprive the legislative 
intervention of the Community of its usefulness. Specific legislative 
provisions allow the Community to elaborate a more comprehensive and 
coherent access policy than that which could be achieved by judicial 
intervention.”
37
 Indeed, regulation may allow regulators to impose more 
stringent and specific conditions upon the incumbent than is possible under 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty. 
 
Once third parties have been granted access, the terms upon which they will 
be granted access will have to be defined. One of the difficulties in defining 
such terms is the determination of the access price. Economists have 
proposed several solutions,
38
 however, due to complexity; these will not be 
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extensively discussed within this paper. In general, fixing inadequate 
charges could distort competition and investments: whilst excessive charges 
could lead to barriers to entry, extremely low charges could induce entry of 
inefficient operators.
39
 
2.2.1.2 Cross-subsidies 
The Notice on the application of competition rules to the postal sector
40
 
defines cross-subsidies as a technique by which “an undertaking bears or 
allocates all or parts of the costs of its activity in one geographical or 
product market to its activity in another geographical or product market.”
41
 
Other definitions refer to a transfer of revenues between diverse activities: 
revenues of a profitable activity are used to cover the losses of an 
unprofitable activity.
42
 Cross-subsidies cause economic inefficiency as some 
products or services will be over-priced while others are sold below cost. 
Cross-subsidies have often been used by state monopolies in order to 
achieve social or political objectives.
43
 Whilst cross-subsidies might not be 
harmful when they accrue solely to monopolised services, their effects in a 
partially liberalised market can be substantial. The welfare effects of cross-
subsidies are such that the price will increase in the regulated market. If the 
unregulated market is characterised by perfect competition than the 
regulated firm will produce where price is less than marginal cost. When the 
unregulated market is characterised by imperfect competition and the 
regulated firm is an inefficient producer of the unregulated product it may 
exclude or reduce the market share of more efficient firms. In addition, 
tactics could result in an increase in the price of the product produced on the 
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unregulated market creating market barriers.
44
 If the regulated monopolist is 
an efficient producer, cross-subsidies may be socially beneficial as they shift 
production from inefficient competitors to the efficient producer. In 
addition, cross-subsidies do not distort competition if they entail the 
allocation of costs or revenues from one reserved service to another, as there 
is no competition within these activities. Competition is also not distorted 
when the revenues of competitive services are allocated to reserved 
services.
45
 
2.2.2 Beneficial effects of regulated firms in unregulated markets 
The above issues such as non-discriminatory access and cross-subsidisation 
are related to the vertical structure of network markets: the incumbent is 
often vertically integrated. These issues are concerned with the question to 
what extent regulated firms (natural monopolists) should be allowed to enter 
into the unregulated market. It must be made clear that the entry of a 
regulated firm into unregulated markets may also have beneficial effects, 
such as the creation of economies of scope. If the regulated monopolist is an 
efficient producer, the tactics of discrimination and cost misallocation may 
be socially beneficial as they shift production from inefficient competitors 
to the efficient producer. In addition vertical structures may entail efficient 
governance structures: vertical integration of the regulated firm minimizes 
production and transaction costs if the regulated product / service is an input 
in the unregulated product / service. Allowing the regulated monopolist to 
enter the unregulated market may actually increase competition in that 
market thereby reducing prices and increasing input if the unregulated 
market is imperfectly competitive. Anticompetitive tactics may thus actually 
be socially beneficial to the extent that they promote output expansion in the 
unregulated market or deter socially inefficient entry.  However, as the 
regulated incumbent is likely to thwart development of competition through 
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pricing and terms of access or interconnection, regulatory response to 
promote competition is often warranted.
46
 
 
Within the European Union, the driving forces of liberalisation are: 1) the 
technological process which reduces the scope of the natural monopoly; 2) 
the demand for lower prices, higher quality and more innovation; 3) 
European integration; 4) pressure from potential market entrants; 5) fiscal 
austerity and the need for investments. The forces obstructing liberalisation 
on the other hand are: 1) fear of reduction in the level of the public service; 
2) the fear of job destruction and reduced job security; 3) incumbents’ fear 
of loss of their privileged positioned; 5) the fear of stranded costs.
47
 The 
creation of liberalisation through competition is a difficult process in which 
a balance must be sought between an unregulated market outcome (in the 
case of a natural monopoly) which will involve market power and cost 
inefficiency at industry level, and a regulated outcome (if perfect) which 
will lead to an efficient market outcome. Perfect regulation is however 
difficult to achieve due to imperfect / asymmetric information and imperfect 
alignment between the objective of the firm on the one hand and society on 
the other hand. The government must choose between imperfect regulation 
and imperfect markets. The efficiency loss of not regulating depends on the 
market power of the firm and the degree of cost inefficiency. The degree 
and type of efficiency which policy makers pursue and thereby the amount 
of regulatory intervention depends on the welfare standard which they wish 
to enhance. The diverse policies with respect to market intervention and the 
related welfare standards will be reviewed in the next paragraphs. 
2.3 Markets and welfare standards 
Economic efficiency refers to the value of the benefit relative to the costs 
incurred in obtaining that benefit. An efficient change indicates a situation 
where the total benefit of the change are greater than the costs of making 
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that change. Economic efficiency encompasses cost efficiency, allocative 
efficiency and dynamic efficiency, whereby dynamic efficiency refers to the 
rate of technological process (allocative and cost efficiency have been 
explained in paragraph 2.1). Whether a change in output is efficient, is 
dependant upon the criteria along which such a change is judged. 
Economists often adhere to the criterion of Pareto efficiency
48
. Pareto 
efficiency refers to the situation where it is impossible to introduce a change 
which will make at least one person better off without making another 
person worse off. The changes are referred to as Pareto improvements. This 
concept of change is rather limited in scope and economists presently favour 
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion of efficiency (potential Pareto improvement). A 
potential Pareto improvement is achieved even if an increase in social 
welfare for one person results in a loss in social welfare for another. 
Winners and losers are thus allowed. The increase in social welfare must 
nevertheless exceed the loss, such that the winners are able to compensate 
the losers and still retain a surplus for themselves.
49
 This compensation is 
however, merely hypothetical, efficiency (social welfare) will be enhanced 
even if compensation does not actually take place. 
 
The foregoing paragraphs have made clear that the rationale underlying 
(de)regulation is the generation of (greater) efficiency in markets. More 
specifically, market failures lead to cost or allocative inefficiencies and 
hence warrant regulation. Allocative, productive and dynamic efficiencies 
however, cannot always be simultaneously realised
50
 and policy makers 
must make a trade-off between these efficiencies.
51
 The resolution of the 
trade-off depends on the relative weight given to the welfare of the different 
groups of market participants, namely consumers and producers.
52
 This 
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allocation of welfare is referred to as the welfare standard. The efficiency of 
the market can be measured through consumer and producer surplus
53
, 
which in combination indicate a degree of social welfare. The welfare 
(which can incorporate consumer, or producer surplus, or a combination of 
both), which the policy maker aims to maximize thus steers the type of 
efficiency to be realised within the market.
54
 Policy makers may pursue to 
enhance either consumer welfare or total welfare. Both standards take as 
point of departure the models of perfect competition versus the models of 
market failure. 
2.3.1 Consumer welfare model 
Consumer welfare can be defined as the maximisation of consumer surplus 
which is realised through “direct and explicit economic benefits received by 
consumers of a particular product measured by its price and quality”
55
. 
Assuming that perfect competition allocates resources optimally at 
minimum cost, the consumer welfare model argues that increases in 
consumer prices due to the exercise of market power by dominant firms 
should be prevented.
56
 By restricting its output and raising its price, the 
monopolist sends a false signal about the relative value of the good to the 
consumer. From a private point of view, the consumer will react optimally 
to the price increase and reduce consumption of the good. This reduction in 
consumption creates a misallocation of resources among industries 
(allocative inefficiency): from a social point of view, too many other goods 
are produced in relation to the monopolized good.
57
 The consumer welfare 
criterion does not assign any weight to producer profits
58
 and disregards the 
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fact that gains to producers can be socially positive. The consumer welfare 
model seeks to minimize the resource misallocation effects of market power 
and only takes into account certain efficiencies, namely those that are of 
direct benefit to consumers.  
2.3.2 Total welfare model 
The total welfare model
59
 maintains that the improvement of society’s total 
welfare is achieved by allocating resources through the price system to those 
users who value them the most.
60
 The total welfare model regards the 
redistribution in the form of wealth transfers from consumers to producers 
as neutral and an increase in total social welfare (generated by a potential 
Pareto improvement) is achieved as soon as an increase (change) in welfare 
exceeds a loss, such that the winners are able to compensate the losers. 
Within this particular model, firms do not have to pass efficiency benefits 
directly on to consumers, as total welfare is already increased by the 
realisation of efficiencies within firm. The only criterion for allocative 
efficiency is that firms gain more than consumers loose. 
2.3.3 Chicago and Harvard school of thought 
The question is, whether the transfer of income from producers to 
consumers (welfare redistribution) should be of concern to policy makers 
and thereby taken into account with respect to market intervention. More 
specifically, the discussion addresses which welfare standard counts and 
how (de)regulation should take place in order to achieve the corresponding 
efficiencies. In this light, two main schools of thought exist: the Chicago 
school and the Harvard school.
61
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2.3.3.1 Chicago school 
The Chicago school of thought regards consumer welfare as a synonym for 
total welfare or allocative efficiency and thereby ignores the redistribution 
of income between market participants. The position that income transfers 
due to market power should be a concern of policy makers is rejected on the 
ground that consumers are producers too.
62
 This school of thought thus 
identifies consumer welfare with overall economic efficiency. According to 
the Chicago school, economic efficiency benefits consumers directly 
through reducing the costs of goods and services and through increasing the 
value of goods and services.
63
 However, the new Chicago school (Post-
Chicagoans), have acknowledged that assimilating consumer welfare with 
economic efficiency is a contradictio in terminus. Consumer welfare does 
not seek to maximize total surplus and concerns a distributional goal, whilst 
economic efficiency may be identified with the maximisation of total 
welfare. The Chicago school thus actually dictates the maximisation of total 
welfare (which they identify with consumer welfare) as it is not concerned 
with the welfare distribution as such, but merely argue that welfare should 
go where it is most appreciated and where it can do most.
64
 
 
According to early ambassadors of the Chicago school (e.g. Simons and 
Knight), social control of monopoly through regulation was not acceptable 
and public ownership should be prescribed for public utility industries.
65
 In 
the late 1950s, Friedman, a representative of the new Chicago School
66
, 
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argued that when technical conditions make a monopoly the natural 
outcome of competitive market forces, a private monopoly may be the least 
of evils. Subject to technical change, it was argued that a private monopoly 
was superior to government regulation or public ownership.
67
 In general, the 
Chicago school is overwhelmingly critical of regulation. However, in 1971, 
Stigler
68
 proposed a theory of economic regulation. As the government is a 
function of strategies of various parties and thus not capable of taking on an 
independent course of action, the theory of economic regulation assigns the 
government a passive role relative to producers as well as to consumers. The 
efficacy of the market mechanism should remain intact, even if it is subject 
to structural imperfections. The theory of economic regulation purports that 
the consumer, unassisted by government control or regulation, should be the 
final arbiter on matters of pollution, abusive practices and output (quantity 
and diversity). Political power in the sense of government intervention and 
control (regulatory constraints on prices, firm structure and service) would 
distort the functioning of the market and thereby consumer preferences, 
leading to resource misallocation and the creation of inefficiencies.  
2.3.3.2 Harvard school 
In contrast to the Chicago school, the Harvard school dictates that market 
power is always harmful and as such should be illegal. The Harvard school 
of thought is based upon the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm.
69
 The SCP paradigm dictates that market structure plays the most 
relevant role in the market. Market structure in turn determines market 
behaviour, and this market conduct drives market performance. Based upon 
the assumption that markets are not perfect, concentration leads to market 
strength that facilitates collusion, thereby decreasing output and increasing 
prices, leading to allocative inefficiencies. Even if a potential Pareto 
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improvement would take place, the Harvard school would argue that welfare 
is not distributed equally amongst market participants, regardless of the fact 
that winners (in the case of collusion, the winners are the producers) are 
hypothetically able to compensate the losers (in this case the consumers). 
 
The Harvard school articulates multiple aims which might justify market 
intervention and regulation: e.g. the distribution of equity, the 
decentralisation of economic power, economic stabilisation, optimal factor 
allocation and consumer sovereignty.
70
 The Harvard school justifies 
regulation if it complies with these goals. In the end market intervention 
should lead to workable competition. As opposed to the Chicago school, 
public ownership and public regulation are favoured over private monopoly. 
The government should not remain passive; this could have a detrimental 
effect on equity distribution, resource allocation, consumer welfare, etc. 
Regulation will protect the consumer from the potential extortion inherent 
monopoly power. 
2.3.4 The European welfare standard 
The models as articulated by the Harvard and Chicago schools of thought 
originate from the United States, where consumer welfare is the overriding 
interest in competition policy. The Chicago representatives assume 
consumer interests are best served by a laissez-faire policy, whilst the 
Harvard ambassadors argue that a socially beneficial outcome can only be 
reached through market intervention. 
 
In Europe, however, the primary force driving interventionist policies is 
market integration. Market integration has had a great influence on 
competition and regulation policy and often taken precedence over the 
economic goals.
71
 The policy geared towards market integration does not 
always promote the interest of consumers.
72
 More specifically state 
intervention is directed at market integration and thereby the general 
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functioning of the economy and consumer protection is but one aspect of the 
intervention policy. It seems that, only with the publication of the White 
Paper on the Modernisation of Competition Rules 1999, have economic 
theories begun to play a role and consumer welfare become more important. 
 
The idea of enhancing European integration through the establishment of an 
internal market matches the ideas of Ordoliberalism. The Ordoliberals 
accept the ideas of classical liberalism, such as the central role competition 
plays as a tool to achieve a free society, and the fact that economic freedom 
can be viewed as a corollary to political freedom. However, the Ordoliberals 
argue that individual freedom must be protected against governmental 
interference and monopolistic power. A legal framework is essential to 
guarantee individual freedom. Such a legal structure should make 
‘complete’ competition
73
 possible and provide for the basic principles of 
economic conduct.
74
 Competition law is assigned a central role in the 
economic society. Ordoliberals argued that the aim of consumer protection 
is the optimisation of freedoms on the market, as such, consumer protection 
is viewed as a complement to the freedom of competition.
75
 The 
Ordoliberals believed that economic policy decisions are not shaped by 
interest groups or political institutions but  by general legal principles 
articulated by the Community. Competition law and issues on integration 
were drafted in juridical terms and not political ones. Market integration 
served as a mechanism of division with regard to the competencies of the 
Member States and the Community. Treaty elements which went beyond the 
concept of market integration were considered functional deficiencies. 
 
A shift has however, taken place from market integration to policy 
integration and from competition policy to industrial policy. In the 1960s 
the Harvard school became influential and provided analysis for European 
competition law, as it still does today. In addition, current Article 95 EC 
Treaty introduced by the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, provided for 
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new areas of minimum harmonisation such as health, safety and 
environmental and consumer protection. As a consequence the power of the 
Community was enlarged, allowing for sector specific regulation. At the 
present, the market intervention policy is concerned with market integration, 
effective competition (individual economic freedom) and consumer welfare, 
driven by the goal of workable competition. Through workable competition 
“perfect competition” can be maintained with certain limitations and 
therefore certain restrictions on competition. The Guidelines on application 
of Article 81(3) affirm the suggestion that consumer protection is becoming 
increasingly important in interventionist policy: “the objective of 81(1) is to 
protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer 
welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.”
76
 
Interventionist policies serve consumer interests through preventing market 
distortions. Market intervention, and specifically competition policy, is 
aimed at promotion of consumer welfare as articulated by the Harvard 
school: “[competition policy’s] aim is to ensure that business operates along 
competitive lines, while protecting consumer by making goods and services 
available on the most favourable terms possible. It therefore endeavours to 
cut monopoly profits.”
77
 Whilst natural monopolies and vertical integration 
lead to cost reduction and increase productive efficiency, they also reduce 
competition and raise prices. Such market structures create obstacles to 
market entry which are not balanced with the efficiencies that such 
structures may generate. Allocative efficiencies are preferred over potential 
cost efficiencies within the firm. Vertical arrangements must benefit the 
consumers, whereby direct short-term benefits are preferred to long-term 
benefits.
78
. In general, Community policy thus pursues an enhancement in 
social welfare where the benefits (profits) gained by producers with market 
power also accrue to consumers. In order to abide by this distribution, the 
Community prefers to rely on strong intervention by public powers rather 
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than to confide in the operation of the market mechanism. This means that 
national monopolies should be strongly regulated in order to assure non-
discriminatory access and prevent harmful cross-subsidisation, whilst the 
liberalised parts of the market should be subject to competition rules in 
order to restrain restrictive practices. 
 
With the Community acknowledging that competition is imperfect and 
market failures exist, they acknowledge the need for legal protection of 
competition and consumers. Welfare is distributed in a way to guarantee 
allocative efficiency and remedy market failures. In general EC consumer 
law can be said to be aimed at the protection of the interests of consumers, 
and the economic and social aspects of the market. If market does not 
generate efficiency, it is legitimate for the state to intervene in order to 
strengthen the market and adjust the environment of consumers. 
2.3.4.1 Parameters measuring European  consumer welfare 
In the light of this paper, it is necessary to define several parameters which 
may indicate the effects of liberalisation on consumer welfare. One of the 
most important parameters which can be used to measure changes in 
consumer welfare is the price. In a natural monopoly, the monopolist 
charges prices which are above the marginal cost price (in a competitive 
equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs), and thus reaps monopolist 
profits. True liberalisation of markets and thus the introduction of 
competition will have a downward effect on price, and must accordingly 
lead to a decrease in prices. Specifically if new entrants are able to pressure 
the high prices charged by the incumbent. The entrance of new players on 
the market thus increases competition between market players as consumers 
are offered a broader range of choice. The entrance of new players however, 
will only be possible if barriers to entry are decreased. In the light of the gas 
market this means that parties must be able to gain access to the gas 
transmission network (TPA). Furthermore they need to be able to conclude 
contracts with gas producers or importers and be able supply in any 
territory.  
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In markets, such as the gas market where consumers conclude contracts 
with their gas supplier, it is also important that consumers are offered clear, 
transparent and non-discriminatory tariffs and conditions. Consumers must 
be able to understand the contracts such that they may compare the diverse 
contracts offered by suppliers.  
 
The aforementioned parameters, are some of the parameters which may 
indicate an increase in consumer welfare. In Chapter 6 and 7, these 
parameters will be addressed more specifically for three different Member 
States: Belgium, Germany and The Netherlands, as well as for liberalisation 
in the European Community in general. 
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3 General European legislative framework 
It is in the Community’s interest to limit Community regulation to a 
minimum level whilst enabling reconciliation of the freedom of movement 
with the legitimate objectives
79
 of the Member States. The Commission has 
made it clear that liberalisation per se is not a fundamental Community 
objective, but a tool to achieve an efficient and competitive European 
economy.
80
 The approach of the Commission with respect to the energy 
market is based upon the subsidiary principle: the legislative foundation 
consists of a broad framework of liberalisation measures, within which each 
Member State is allowed to opt for the system that each considers most 
appropriate considering the specific characteristics of their market. 
 
Whilst sectoral directives are aimed at dismantling Member States of 
monopoly or regulated industries, general competition rules apply in order 
to ensure that new arrangements which replace former state monopolies will 
not restrict competitive development. With regard to the liberalisation and 
subsequently integration of the energy sector: “The integration of the energy 
market by either harmonization, mutual recognition or direct application of 
the rules of the Treaty, establishes the mechanism for cooperation between 
companies and the basis for their competitiveness on the world markets”
81
. 
The articles concerned with striking the balance between state intervention 
and insuring undistorted competition are Articles 23-31 EC Treaty on the 
free movement of goods, Articles 81-89 EC Treaty concerning competition 
rules, Articles 154-156 EC Treaty on Trans-European networks and Article 
16 of the EC Treaty.
82
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3.1 Article 31 EC Treaty83 
The EC rules on the free movement of goods and services seek to prevent 
barriers to trade being maintained by Member States. As such, Part III of the 
EC Treaty (Articles 23-31), prohibits Member States to take any measures 
which may directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, constitute a barrier 
to the free movement of goods in the light of intra-community trade. The 
provision does not apply to  restrictions on trade which are inevitably 
related to the existence of monopolies functioning in the pursuit of public 
interest aims. 
 
Article 31 in particular, requires Member States to adjust
84
 a state monopoly 
of a commercial character in such a manner that no discrimination 
concerning the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed 
exists between nationals of Member States. More precisely Article 31(1) 
states: 
 
“Member States shall adjust any State monopolies of a commercial 
character so as to ensure that no discrimination regarding the conditions 
under which goods are procured and marketed exists between national of 
Member States. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any body 
through which a Member State, in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly 
supervises, determines or appreciably influences imports or exports between 
Member States. These provisions shall likewise apply to monopolies 
delegated by the State to others.” 
 
Article 31 concerns goods and does not apply to services.
85
 Article 31 
however, does relate to monopolies which concern the provision of services, 
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in so far as such monopolies discriminate against imported goods as 
opposed to domestic goods.
86
 Electricity and gas are treated as goods and 
fall within the scope of Article 31.
87
 
 
In order to fall under Article 31, the State must be able to control, direct or 
influence appreciably intra-community trade through a body established for 
the purpose or through a delegated monopoly.
88
 Article 31 precludes the 
establishment of bodies with exclusive rights to import or export a particular 
product, as this gives rise to discrimination against importers established in 
other Member States.
89
 Various monopolies concerning the import and sale 
of natural gas and electricity have been held to fall under the scope of 
Article 31.
90
 An example of a monopoly which has been delegated by the 
State to another body, is the grant of exclusive natural gas import and 
marketing rights which the Belgium Government delegated to Distrigaz.
91
 
Article 31 only applies to national provisions which enable a public 
monopoly to exercise exclusive rights. The provision does not apply to 
national provisions which apply in general to the production and marketing 
of the product in question. An Italian body which was entitled to distribute 
tobacco products made in Italy, was held not to fall within the scope of 
Article 31, as the State could not use these rights to intervene in the 
procurement choices of retailers, nor to ensure an outlet for the monopoly’s 
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product, nor to en- or discourage imports.
92
 In addition, in France, local 
authorities had been given the choice to 1) grant private funeral service 
undertakings in their area a concession; 2) to leave the sector unregulated 
or; 3) to extend their services to the operation of funeral services. A couple 
of authorities ended up granting undertakings within the same group a 
concession and as such, these appointed companies were able to influence 
imports in the new situation. However, the companies could not be 
characterised as a national monopoly as the new situation was a result of 
their conduct and not of the national or municipal authorities.
93
  
3.2 Articles 81-89 EC Treaty (competition rules) 
Strong Community competition policy plays an essential role in keeping and 
reinforcing the internal market, and thereby enhancing integration.
94
 
Competition rules are complementary to the provisions on free movement 
(Articles 23-31 EC Treaty), as they prevent barriers to trade being re-erected 
by private agreements. Prior to the intervention of the Commission through 
sector specific regulation, competition rules were applied (and still are) in 
the energy market in order to ensure market integration and competitive 
markets.  
3.2.1 Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty 
Articles 81 to 82 EC Treaty contain the rules which must warrant and 
govern competition within the Community. Articles 81 prohibits and 
declares void all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common 
market.
95
 Article 82 prohibits the abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
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dominant position within the common market or a substantial part of it, as 
far as it may affect interstate trade.  
3.2.2 Article 86 EC Treaty96 
Article 86 is especially important in the light of this paper, as it ensures that 
rules on competition apply equally to the public undertakings and 
undertakings to which the Member States grant special or exclusive rights. 
 
Article 86(1) of the EC Treaty states: 
 
“In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member 
States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact 
nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this 
Treaty, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 
to 89.” 
 
In contrast to Articles 81 and 82, Article 86(1) is not addressed to 
undertakings but to Member States. Articles 86(1) and (2) are only infringed 
by a government measure when the undertaking acting pursuant to that 
measure necessarily infringes another article of the EC Treaty.
97
 The most 
common provisions are Articles 31, 49 (services) EC Treaty, and Articles 81 
and 82 EC Treaty. 
 
Even though the EC Treaty does not define the term ‘public undertaking’, 
the Commission states that the term includes every undertaking over which 
public authorities may exercise, directly or indirectly, a dominant influence 
by 1) virtue of ownership of it; 2) their financial participation in it or 3) the 
rules which govern it. The term ‘measures’ within Article 86, refers to acts 
directed to undertakings. These measures may include legislative acts 
affecting undertakings, administrative decisions, the exercise of 
shareholders rights, non-binding recommendations etc. 
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Undertakings granted special or exclusive rights may fall within the scope 
of Article 86, as Member States that grant the undertakings such rights, are 
able to adopt measures that would favour these privileged undertakings over 
others and as such distort competition.
98
 The mere grant of an exclusive or 
special right is not in itself contrary to Article 86(1). However, such a grant 
may become incompatible with the EC Treaty in the same way as any other 
measure.
99
 Considering the fact that a Member State has a margin of 
appreciation,  the grant of an exclusive right is not per se unlawful, in the 
case that the exclusive right is necessary in order to perform a task of 
general economic interest or social task which has been entrusted to the 
undertaking.
100
 In addition, the grant of an exclusive right must inevitably 
(and effectively) lead the undertaking to infringe a provision of the EC 
Treaty, or create a situation, in which the undertaking is inevitably led to 
commit abuse; the mere fact that the grant enables the undertaking (if it so 
wishes) to infringe the EC Treaty, is not enough to cause an infringement of 
Article 86(1).
101
 In several ECJ cases, State measures were challenged as the 
undertaking which had been granted an exclusive right, was unable to 
satisfy the demand for service in the Member State. Such a right then limits 
output and thus infringes Article 82 in conjunction with Article 86(1) EC 
Treaty.
102
 Measures which allow an undertaking to extend its market power 
into the neighbouring market, may also be in breach of Article 86(1) in 
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conjunction with Article 82 EC Treaty.
103
 In addition, infringement of 
Article 86(1) in conjunction with Article 82 may be assumed when certain 
measures allow an undertaking to exert control over aspects of its 
competitors’ business.
104
 Abuse of a dominant position, and thus 
infringement of Article 82 in conjunction with Article 86 may also occur, if 
the undertaking which has been granted exclusive rights, charges excessive 
prices.
105
 
 
Article 86(2) states that: 
 
“Undertakings entrusted with the operation of a services of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue producing monopoly 
shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular the rules 
on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct 
performance, in law or fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The 
development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be 
contrary to the interests of the Community.” 
 
Article 86(2) applies to undertakings - as opposed to Article 86(1) - which 
are generally subject to the rules of the EC Treaty, but which are dismissed 
from the application of these rules under certain circumstances. Article 86 
“[…] makes for the best possible interaction between market efficiency and 
general interest requirements by ensuring that the means used to satisfy the 
requirements do not unduly interfere with the smooth running of the single 
European market and do not affect trade to an extent that would be contrary 
to the Community interest.”
106
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A Member State may rely on Article 86(2) in combination with Article 
86(1) EC Treaty, in order to justify the grant of exclusive rights (that would 
otherwise involve the breach of a provision of the EC Treaty) to an 
undertaking entrusted with the operation of services of general economic 
interest.
107
 As the ECJ has stated: “that provision seeks to reconcile the 
Member States’ interests in using certain undertakings, in particular in the 
public sector, as an instrument of economic or fiscal policy with the 
Community’s interest in ensuring compliance with the rules on competition 
and the preservation of the unity of the common Market.”
108
 
 
In the Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe
109
, the term 
‘services of general economic interest’ (which is narrower than the term 
‘services of general interest’) is defined as referring “to services of an 
economic nature which the Member States or the Community subject to 
specific public service obligations by virtue of a general interest 
criterion.”
110
 The term thus extends to include particular services (PSOs) 
provided by network industries such as transport, postal services, energy 
and telecommunications. As Article 86(2) applies to services of general 
economic interest, the provision does not apply to non-economic activities 
such as compulsory education, social security, justice diplomacy
111
, nor to 
services that are specifically aimed at managing private interests
112
. It seems 
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that services do not have to benefit the whole of the national economy but 
merely a certain group of the population.
113
 
 
An act of public authority in the form of a specific national law
114
 or other 
act of public authority
115
 is needed to entrust an undertaking with the 
operation of services of general economic interest. In order for obligations 
assigned to the undertaking to fall within the scope of the entrusted task, the 
obligations must relate to the subject matter of the service and be aimed at 
making a direct contribution to satisfying the general economic interest 
relied upon.
116
 The task which has been entrusted to the undertaking must be 
distinguishable from other services provided by the undertaking and thus 
dissociable from the task. Infringement of the competition rules caused by 
dissociable services cannot be justified, unless these services and the 
restrictions they impose contribute to maintaining the economic equilibrium 
of the service of general economic interest.
117
  
 
The derogation of the EC Treaty rules granted to particular undertakings 
under Article 86(2), does not confer upon the undertakings as such, but in 
respect of the particular tasks assigned to them.
118
 In case 157-159/94
119
, the 
ECJ reformulated the derogation test and stated that it was sufficient that the 
Treaty rules obstruct the performance in law or in fact of special obligations 
entrusted to an undertaking. In order to attain derogation, it is not necessary 
for the survival of the undertaking to be threatened in absence of 
derogation.
120
 However, the tailpiece of Article 86(2) entails that derogation 
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will only be given, if the development of trade is not “affected to such an 
extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community” (this is the 
case, regardless of the fact that an undertaking is able to prove that normal 
application of the Treaty rules obstructs performance of its entrusted task). 
This concept is narrower than the concept of ‘effect on trade’ articulated in 
Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty. Article 86(2) is thus concerned with the 
appraisal of a particular task entrusted to a certain undertaking and the 
protection of interests of the Community in relation to the development of 
trade. 
 
Article 86(3) states: 
 
“The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions of this 
Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate directives or 
decisions to Member States.” 
 
On basis of this Article the Commission may construe decisions and 
regulation in order to enforce Article 86(1) of the EC Treaty.  
 
The Telecommunications Directives
121
 have been drafted based upon 
Article 86(3). 
3.3 Commission decisions concerning the gas sector  
The Commission applies the competition rules to the gas sector. The 
Commission has for example, applied the competition rules to the gas sector 
in order to ensure Third Party Access (TPA)
122
. In 1995, two leading gas 
companies had the intention of establishing a joint venture. The joint 
venture activities would concern the construction and operation of a UK-
Belgium underwater gas interconnector. This interconnector would form a 
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bridge between the UK and the Continent and provide for the transmission 
of gas. The interconnector may be characterised as a bottleneck facility. The 
Commission cleared the joint venture agreement under the condition that 
TPA remained possible on freely negotiated terms, and argued that the new 
pipeline would create competition between the UK and the Continent.
123
 In 
2001 however, several complaints from within the sector led the 
Commission to start a new investigation concerning TPA of the UK-
Belgium interconnector.
124
 After the companies had agreed to take measures 
in order to facilitate TPA to the pipeline, the Commission closed the 
investigation. Three other cases concerning TPA are Marathon - 
Thyssengas, Marathon - Gasunie and Blugas - Snam.
 125
 
 
On 26 November 2004, the Commission stated that territorial restriction 
clause may infringe Article 81 EC Treaty.
126
 Earlier cases concerning the 
supply of gas, in particular agreements containing territorial restriction 
(restriction to sell gas outside of the national territory), reduction (allow 
buyer to reduce the volumes bought from the seller if the latter starts selling 
into the supply area of the buyer) or use restriction clauses (prevent buyer 
from using gas for other purposes than agreed to with the seller)
127
, had not 
led to infringement of Article 81 EC Treaty. These cases had all been closed 
after settlements had resulted in elimination of such clauses.
128
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Other cases concerning the supply of gas, but not specifically certain 
restrictive clauses, are Transgàs/Turbogàs
129
 and Synergen
130
. 
 
In contrast to more recent cases, which address competition concerns 
regarding the supply of gas (downstream markets), earlier competition cases 
were mainly concerned with gas production (upstream markets). Both 
Corrib
131
 and GFU
132
 regarded decisions of a group of companies to jointly 
market the gas they produced. Both cases were either settled or withdrawn. 
The upstream market was also analysed in respect of merger cases. Cases 
which entailed a detailed investigation by the Commission of upstream 
markets for the exploration and development of natural gas were 
Exxon/Mobil
133
 and BP Amoco/Atlantic Richfield
134
. In Exxon/Mobil, the 
Commission initially found that the operation would have led to a 
strengthening of a dominant position in the German market concerning both 
the long distance wholesale transmission of natural gas and the storage of 
natural gas. In addition the operation would restrict competition on the 
market concerning the  wholesale transmission of natural gas in the 
Netherlands. However, the operation was allowed as parties remedied these 
concerns. The BP Amoco/Atlantic Richfield operation would have created a 
dominant position on the market for the transport of unprocessed natural gas 
to the UK mainland through off-shore pipelines from fields in the Southern 
North Sea (SNS) sector of the UK continental shelf and also on the market 
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for processing natural gas in processing facilities on the UK mainland, 
servicing the SNS area. As parties undertook to divest certain pipeline and 
processing interests, the operation raised no further concerns.
135
 
 
In a recent ruling, the Commission objected to the acquisition of GDP by 
ENI and EDP, as this would lead to a strengthened dominant position of 
EDP and GDP on the Portuguese markets for electricity and gas.
136
 The 
commitments offered by the companies could not reverse the opinion of the 
Commission. This ruling stands in contrast with earlier merger operations in 
the gas sector, where commitments were often enough to gain Commission 
approval.
137
 
3.4 Articles 87 to 89 EC Treaty (rules on state aid) 
The provisions concerning state aid (Articles 87 to 89 EC Treaty) also play 
role a role in the furtherance of the internal market. Fair market competition, 
and thereby an integrated market, would be obstructed if a Member States 
were able to subsidise their industries. Article 87(1) EC Treaty declares 
incompatible with the common market, in so far as it affects intra-
Community trade, “[…] any aid granted by a Member State […] which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods […].  
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State aid has been granted by Member States in order to enhance 
development in the gas sector, in particular with regard to the distribution 
system. In Denmark for example, five natural gas distribution companies 
and the publicly owned company Dangas had been benefiting from a tax 
relief measure since the 1980s in order to enhance the construction and 
expansion of the natural gas system. The measure however was not held to 
infringe Article 87 on the basis of Article 86(2) EC Treaty.
138
 On 6 May 
1998, the Commission approved the investment aid of ECU 72.3 million in 
order to extend the Irish natural gas network.
139
 
 
Another State aid case concerns Italy, which granted tax exemptions and 
preferential loans to majority publicly owned local public service companies 
when they agreed to transform into joint-stock companies. As such, these 
joint-stock companies would take over the provision of services such as gas, 
electricity, water; services traditionally  provided by the municipalities.
140
 In 
2001, the Commission approved state aid - in the form of grants and 
accelerated depreciation granted - by Greece to three newly formed natural 
gas distribution companies in Attica, Thessaloniki and Thessaly. As the aid 
was intended to promote the introduction of gas as a mainstream energy 
source, the Commission found that the aid had clear and obvious benefits 
for whole region.
141
 
3.5 Article 16 EC Treaty 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (datum) introduced a new Article 16 in the EC 
Treaty, which states that: 
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“Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87 and given the place occupied 
by services of general economic interest in the shared values of the Union as 
well as their role in promoting social and territorial cohesion, the 
Community and the Member States, each within their respective powers and 
within the scope of the application of this Treaty, shall take care that such 
services operate on the basis of principles and conditions which enable them 
to fulfil their missions.” 
 
This article can be seen as a reference to the role of services of general 
economic interest, as articulated by Article 86 EC Treaty. Article 16 EC 
Treaty “recognizes the fundamental character of the values underpinning 
such services and the need for the Community to take into account their 
function in devising and implementing all its policies, placing it among the 
principles of the Treaty […]”.
142
  
3.6 Articles 154 to 156 EC Treaty (Trans-European networks) 
Articles 154-156 (Title XII) EC Treaty have been introduced in order to 
enhance the inter-connection and inter-operability of national energy 
networks as well as access to those networks. In general, these provisions 
enable the adoption of guidelines and provisions of financial support. 
                                                 
142
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4 European Energy policy 
European Energy policy has long been one of the activities of the European 
Community. As early as 1951, the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC)
143
, signed by France, Germany, Italy and the 
three Benelux countries
144
, provided for cooperation and market integration 
in the area of steel and coal. In 1957, the ECSC Treaty was followed by the 
Treaty of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
145
, aimed at 
the establishment of an integrated market in atomic energy. In 1957 the 
Treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC)
146
 was also signed, 
which concerned the establishment of a European Economic Community in 
goods, capital, labour and services, and (at that time) contained no specific 
provisions on any form of energy.  
 
However, it soon became evident that Community energy policy should 
extend to include oil, gas and other sources of (renewable) energy. The 
awareness of the importance of a common energy policy developed in 
tandem with a growing awareness of environmental issues
147
, the 
enlargement of the Community and the development of relations with non-
member states. In 1964, the Member States of the Community gathered to 
establish a Community Energy Policy, the main objective being “the need 
for greater integration, free from barriers to trade, of the internal energy 
market with a view to improving the security of supply, reducing costs and 
improving economic competitiveness”.  
 
The amendments made to the EC Treaty by the Single European Act (SEA) 
148
 of 1986, the Treaty on European Union (TEU or Maastricht Treaty) in 
1993, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999; and more recently the Treaty of 
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Nice, signed on 26 February 2001, have facilitated the creation of an 
internal energy market. The (general) single market aim was enforced 
through the SEA which set the deadline for the establishment of the internal 
market on 31 December 1992 (Article 14, ex Article 7a EC Treaty) and 
defined the internal market as “an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (Article 14(2) EC Treaty). In 
1993, the TEU introduced “measures in the sphere of energy [..]”, as one of 
the activities of the Community (Article 3 EC Treaty) and added Title XV to 
the EC Treaty (now Articles 154-156 EC Treaty), which sets out provisions 
aimed at the promotion of trans-European networks in the field of transport, 
telecommunications and energy infrastructures. As such, the SEA and the 
TEU have lead to enhanced Community policy in the energy sector. 
 
Soon after the entry into force of the SEA, the Commission presented a 
working paper, which set out a strategy for achieving an internal energy 
market.
149
 The working document led to a range of legislation being adopted 
throughout the 1990s, that aimed to fully integrate the separate European 
electricity and gas markets, with the goal of inducing competition in the 
respective markets and hence reduce the prices paid by consumers. The 
Price Transparency Directive
150
 of 1990 sought to encourage competition by 
improving the transparency of electricity and gas prices charged to 
industrial customers. The Electricity Transit Directive and the Gas Transit 
Directive respectively, aimed to remove obstacles to intra-Community trade 
of electricity and gas, by asking Member States to facilitate transit through 
transmission grids. The directives however, did not entail any actual 
obligation to do so. 
 
Over the years the energy sector became increasingly important, specifically 
in the light of the single market aim under Article 14 of the EC Treaty. It 
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became evident that a policy which was of prime importance to the energy 
sector, was the establishment of the internal energy market, more 
specifically, the establishment of a competitive natural gas market. 
European gas prices were considerably higher than gas prices in other G7 
countries, notably the US and Canada
151
. Gas prices within the EU for the 
same type of customer varied considerably between Member States and 
within Member States, to an extent that could not merely be explained by 
differences in supply situations and costs. These large differences created 
distortions for competition within the EU. It was however, the publication of 
the Green Paper on Energy Policy “For a European Union Energy Policy” 
in 1995
152
, that triggered the actual liberalisation of the energy (more 
specifically gas) markets in Europe. Taking into account the fact that the 
energy market in general and energy prices in particular, play a central role 
in overall industrial competitiveness, the Green Paper aimed to launch the 
policy discussion as to whether or not the Community should play a greater 
role in the field of energy. The Green Paper indicated that a Community 
policy should be able to ensure the satisfaction of all users needs at minimal 
cost, while meeting the requirements of security of supply and 
environmental protection. The advantages and efficiencies reached through 
market integration could decrease costs. Cross-border cooperation in the 
field of gas supply for example, will lead to synergies and economies of 
scale, reducing costs. Market opening will stimulate intra-community trade, 
and competition will increase competitive pressures on energy suppliers and 
force them to provide the best possible service at lowest possible price in 
order to maintain customer loyalty. In the UK where full market opening 
and gas-to-gas competition were introduced in 1998, 30% of gas customers 
(> 5 million) have already changed supplier and as result achieved 
significant benefits
153
. Security of supply can be regarded as “ensuring that 
                                                 
151
 United States 132,5 USD/toe and Canada 78,4 USD/toe, whilst Netherlands 136,7 and 
France 153,9 and Ireland 190,6 only UK lower 120,8 (European Commission (July 2000), 
Opening up to choice: launching the single European gas market, Luxembourg: Office for 
official publications of the European Communities). 
152
 European Commission, Green paper, For a European Union energy policy, COM(94) 
659, 23.02.1995. 
153
 Consumers have saved EUR 3,2 billion due to lower energy bills following liberalisation 
(European Commission (July 2000), Opening up to choice: launching the single European 
gas market, Luxembourg: Office for official publications of the European Communities). 
 51 
future essential energy needs are satisfied by means of sharing of internal 
energy resources and strategic reserves under acceptable economic 
conditions and by making use of diversified and stable externally accessible 
sources.”
154
 This concept includes physical security, economic security and 
continuity of supply. Market integration in itself will act as an instrument of 
security of supply as it will bring companies a market dimension they need 
for investment and increase the amount of energy sources accessible to 
Member States. The introduction of a Community framework for energy 
will facilitate the exploitation of the substantial potential of energy 
efficiency. The enhancement of energy market performance will reduce 
environmental impacts. Market integration as such thus seems to have a 
positive impact on the diverse policy objectives. The debate triggered by the 
1995 Green Paper, resulted in the adoption of an Electricity Directive
155
 and 
Gas Directive 1998 and 2003
156
 respectively. More specifically, the gas 
directives are concerned with the common rules for the internal market of 
natural gas
157
. The objectives of the Gas Directive 1998 are based on the 
gradual establishment of the internal market in natural gas, in order to 
enable the industry to adjust flexibly and to be able to take into account the 
different market structures in the Member States. 
 
As well as liberalising markets, the EU is also concerned with the further 
expansion of existing infrastructures and energy networks, especially 
electricity and gas transmission systems, to promote competition and 
integration through a series of initiatives under the heading Trans-European 
Networks (TENs). The Council has adopted an Energy Framework 
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Programme covering the period 1998-2002
158
, which was extended to the 
period 2003-2006
159
 through the adoption of a new Energy Framework 
Programme. The goal of the Energy Framework Programme is to regroup 
existing programmes and actions in the context of energy policy, 
acknowledging the three main objectives of security and supply, 
competitiveness and the environment, while responding to the need to 
ensure greater transparency, co-ordination, simplification and efficiency of 
the actions taken in light of the Community energy policy. 
                                                 
158
 Council Decision of 14 December 1998, adopting a multiannual framework programme 
for actions in the energy sector (1998-2002) and connected measures, OJ 1999 L7/16. 
159
 Decision No 1230/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2003, adopting a multiannual programme for action in the field of energy: “Intelligent 
Energy - Europe” (2003-2006), OJ 2003 L 176/29. 
 53 
5 Energy market legislation 
Cross-border trade is important to achieve an integrated single gas market. 
As such, the internal market in natural gas should favour the interconnection 
and interoperability of systems, indicating the need for coherent technical 
and commercial trading rules. The integration of the gas markets should 
enhance competition and consequently lead to lower prices. In addition, 
integration will generate efficiency in e.g. the security of supply and intra-
Community trade. Due to integration, the security of supply, i.e. product 
availability and regulation, becomes a competitive parameter and 
contributes to the quality of both products and services offered by individual 
gas suppliers. 
 
The enactment of Council Directive 91/296/EEC of 31 May 1991 on the 
transit of natural gas through grids
160
 and the Council Directive 90/377/EEC 
of 29 June 1990 concerning a Community procedure to improve the 
transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial end-users
161
 
constituted a first step towards the establishment of an internal market in 
natural gas. However, in order to fully establish an internal market in natural 
gas, further measures had to be taken. The initial proposals for opening up 
the markets for natural gas and electricity were based on Article 86(3) EC 
Treaty (ex Article 90(3) EC Treaty). This choice was in accordance with the 
Telecommunications Directives
162
, which were also based on Article 86(3) 
of the EC Treaty. In addition, the choice for Article 86(3) EC Treaty was 
strengthened by the recent ruling of the ECJ in Case 202/88
163
, in which the 
ECJ stated that Member States do not have an exclusive competence in 
relation to the grant of legal monopolies (complete sovereignty). Two years 
later however, the Court acknowledged the right of Member States to grant 
monopoly rights, subject to certain conditions.
164
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The first drafts of the gas and electricity directives received quite some 
critiques from within the industry. The proposals also encountered quite 
some resistance of the European legislative institutions; the European 
Parliament wanted to be involved in the legislative process. If the directives 
were to be based upon Article 95 EC Treaty, the final word was for Council, 
where resistance to any loosening of monopolies could be expected from 
Member States. The pressure led the subsequent proposals of the 
Commission were therefore based upon Article 95 EC Treaty (ex Article 
100a EC Treaty), requiring Council approval by qualified majority voting. 
The choice of Article 95 EC Treaty indicated a major retreat for the 
Commission: whereas directives enacted on the basis of Article 86(3) EC 
Treaty can give immediate effect to the Commission’s intentions, the use of 
Article 95 EC Treaty necessarily implies that such intentions can only 
become effective once the procedural requirements have been satisfied. 
Negotiating history shows how difficult it is to meet these requirements, as 
the new proposals once more encountered strong resistance.
165
 Opponents 
feared that consumers might bear the costs of liberalisation. In 1993, the 
Commission submitted separate proposals for the liberalisation of the gas 
and electricity markets (based on Article 95 EC Treaty), instead of one 
directive aimed at liberalisation of both markets. The liberalisation of the 
electricity market finally became reality on 19 February 1997, with the entry 
into force of the Electricity Directive 96/92/EC. 
 
Whilst the negotiations for a gas directive continued, the Commission’s 
power to pursue liberalisation through the ECJ were being tested in a case 
against import-export monopolies for electricity and gas.
166
 In its final 
ruling, the ECJ indicated a reluctance to allow the Commission to pursue 
Court driven market opening. In 1997 a compromise was finally reached, 
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and the European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 98/30/EC 
of 22 June 1998 concerning the common rules for the internal market of 
natural gas
167
 (“Gas Directive 1998”), which entered into force on 10 
August 1998. The Gas Directive 1998 generally incorporates the same key 
principles as the Electricity Directive, but reflects the specific technical and 
commercial characteristics of the gas sector. The Commission expects that 
the gas industry should benefit from the experience gained over the 
liberalisation of electricity.
168
  
5.1 Gas Directive 1998 
The objectives of the Gas Directive 1998 are based on the gradual 
establishment of the internal market in natural gas, in order to enable the 
industry to adjust flexibly and to be able to take into account the different 
market structures in the Member States. According to the Gas Directive 
1998 the gas markets in the Member States should guarantee an absolute 
minimum of 33% market opening by 2008. The Gas Directive 1998 
establishes the common rules for transmission, distribution, supply and 
storage of natural gas. The key features of the Gas Directive 1998 include 
the abolition of exclusive rights to import and export gas and operate gas 
facilities, and the possible designation of PSOs. Furthermore, the directive 
lays down the rules relating to market access, transparency and non-
discrimination, unbundling, the designation of eligible customers,  and the 
grant of authorisations for transmission, distribution, supply and storage of 
natural gas. The Member States must bring into force the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive before 
August 10
th
, 2000. The different features of the Gas Directive 1998 will be 
extensively discussed below. 
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5.1.1 Third Party Access (TPA) 
One of the main issues for liberalisation is whether and under which terms, 
third parties will be able to gain access to the grid or pipeline.
169
 The Gas 
Directive 1998 sets out two procedures which may be followed in order to 
organise access to the system: the systems of negotiated and regulated 
access. Member States are free to choose one of the two systems or a 
combination of both (Article 14 Gas Directive 1998). Negotiated access 
(Article 15 of the Gas Directive 1998) is based upon negotiations (in good 
faith) between natural gas undertakings and eligible customers so as to 
conclude supply contracts with each other on the basis of voluntary 
commercial agreements. The gas undertakings are required to publish their 
main commercial conditions for the use of the system. Within the system of 
regulated access (Article 16 Gas Directive 1998), parties (eligible customers 
and gas undertakings) have a right of access to the system on the basis of 
published tariffs and/or terms and obligations for use of the system. Both 
systems of access must operate in accordance with objective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory criteria. On both occasions (regulated and 
negotiated access), the system operator may refuse access based upon 1) a 
of lack of capacity, 2) the fact that granting access would prevent it from 
carrying out the assigned PSOs or 3) financial difficulties concerning take-
or-pay contracts (Article 17 Gas Directive 1998). Take-or-pay contracts 
refer to long-term contracts under which buyers guarantee to take and pay, 
but inevitably pay, for a large production of contract volume even if they 
cannot sell the gas. Liberalisation will have a downward effect on price, 
putting the companies with concluded take-or-pay contracts in a difficult 
position. The access denial will protect the market of such a supplier.  
5.1.2 Non-discrimination and transparency 
Articles 7-11 of the Gas Directive 1998 require transmission, storage, LNG 
and distribution undertakings to refrain from discriminating between 
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different system users, in particular in favour of their related undertakings. 
Without prejudice to legal duties to disclose information, these undertakings 
shall also preserve the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information 
obtained in the course of carrying out their business. In this respect they 
shall not abuse commercially sensitive information that they have gained 
from third parties in the context of providing or negotiating access to the 
system. The prohibition on the flow of this type of information, when an 
undertaking is both active as a system operator and a supplier, is referred to 
as a “Chinese wall” and is aimed at preventing the distortion of competition 
through discrimination.  
5.1.3 Eligible customers 
Customer choice is the key to competition, and as from 10 August 2000 so-
called ‘eligible customers’ will be free to choose their gas supplier. 
According to Article 18 of the Gas Directive 1998, eligible customers are 
those customers which (inside their territory) have the legal capacity to 
contract for, or to be sold, natural gas in accordance with Articles 15 and 16 
of the Directive. According to paragraph 2 of Article 18, the eligible 
customers must include at least gas-fired power generators and other final 
customers consuming more than 25 million cubic metres of gas per year on 
a consumption site basis. The definition of eligible customers will result in 
market opening of at least 20% of the total annual gas consumption of the 
national gas markets. This percentage shall increase to 28 percent five years 
after entry into force of the directive and to 33% thereof in 10 years. In 
order to ensure that the opening of the market is increased over a period of 
10 years, paragraph 6 of Article 18 states several thresholds. In addition, 
Article 20 of the Gas Directive 1998, states that Member States shall take 
measures to enable gas undertakings established within their territory to 
supply eligible customers through a direct line.  
 
The fact that customers will be able to choose their supplier, will pressure 
the diverse undertakings along the gas chain to improve their customer 
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service, e.g. cut costs and reduce price. New entrants to the gas market will 
increase this pressure to the advantage of customers.  
5.1.4 Public Service Obligations (PSOs) 
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Gas Directive 1998, confers upon Member 
States the possibility to impose on natural gas undertakings, public service 
obligations in the general economic interest (these generally fall within the 
scope of Article 86(2) EC Treaty). The PSOs may relate to security, 
including the security of supply, regularity, quality and prices of suppliers 
and to environmental protection. The PSOs must be clearly defined, non-
discriminatory and verifiable. The measures adopted to fulfil public service 
obligations should be reported to the Commission. 
5.1.5 Authorisation for the operation or construction of new natural gas 
facilities 
Article 4 of the Gas Directive 1998 provides for an authorisation system 
with respect to licensing the construction or operation of natural gas 
facilities. The system of authorisation must provide for objective and non-
discriminatory criteria (that are made public), which shall be met by the 
undertaking applying for an authorisation. Objective and non-discriminatory 
reasons must be given when authorisation is refused. 
5.1.6 Unbundling and transparency of accounts 
Articles 12 and 13 of the Gas Directive 1998 relate to the unbundling and 
transparency of accounts. The designated authority must be able to access 
the accounts of natural gas undertakings
170
, taking into account that they 
must preserve the confidentiality of this information (except if this obstructs 
them in the exercise of their function). In general, integrated undertakings 
must (in their internal accounting) keep separate accounts for their natural 
gas transmission, distribution and storage activities, and where appropriate, 
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consolidated accounts for non-gas activities, with the view to avoid 
discrimination, cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition.  
5.1.7 Designation of competent authority 
Article 21 of the Gas Directive 1998 specifies that Member States must 
designate a competent authority, which is not related to the parties, to settle 
disputes. The authority is in particular concerned with disputes related to 
negotiations and refusal of access. In addition, Member States shall create 
appropriate measures and efficient mechanisms for regulation control and 
transparency (Article 22 Gas Directive 1998). 
5.2 Gas Directive 2003 
The entry into force of the Gas Directive 1998, has brought along positive 
effects of market opening. The Directive has ensured the free movement of 
electricity and gas within the Community.
171
 The degree of liberalisation 
however, still varies greatly between Member States. In order to complete 
the internal energy market and reap the full benefits of liberalisation, further 
measures are thus necessary. These measures concern the degree of market 
opening (quantitative proposals) and minimum obligations regarding access 
to the network, consumer protection, regulation and the unbundling of 
transmission and distribution functions in integrated gas and electricity 
companies (qualitative proposals).
172
 In Lisbon, in March 2000, the 
European Council summoned the Commission to revise the directives on 
gas and electricity in order to accelerate the liberalisation process.
 173
 On the 
basis of these recommendations, the Commission formulated a proposal to 
amend the Gas Directive 1998. The new “acceleration directive” contained 
two clear priorities: 1) an expedited process of market opening; and 2) 
ensuring fair and non-discriminatory TPA to the gas networks.
174
 In 
addition, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation setting out 
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the principles and procedures regarding the conditions for access to the 
network for cross border exchanges of electricity. On the 4
th
 of August 
2004, the new Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 26 June 2003 concerning the common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas entered into force (Gas Directive 2003), repealing Gas 
Directive 1998. Many of the provisions of the new gas directive are 
comparable with those of Gas Directive 1998. In the next few paragraphs, 
the changes will be discussed. 
5.2.1 Third Party Access (TPA) 
In contrast to Gas Directive 1998, which allowed Member States to choose 
between systems of negotiated or regulated access or a combination of both, 
Gas Directive 2003 stipulates regulated access with respect to the 
transmission and distribution system of gas and LNG facilities. Member 
States are thus obliged to ensure access based on the publication of tariffs, 
applicable to all eligible customers (including supply undertakings) and 
applied objectively and without discrimination between system users 
(Article 18 Gas Directive 2003). The provisions of the new directive do not 
prevent the conclusion of long-term contracts as long as they do not infringe 
Community competition rules. 
 
Concerning the access to storage facilities and line pack, when technically 
and/or economically necessary in order to provide access to the supply 
system as well as for the organisation of access to ancillary services, 
Member States may still choose between negotiated or regulated access or a 
combination of both (Article 19 Gas Directive 2003). This choice however, 
shall not apply to ancillary services and temporary storage that are related to 
LNG facilities and are necessary for the re-gasification process and 
subsequent delivery to the transmission system (Article 19, paragraph 2). 
 
Furthermore, Article 20 Gas Directive 2003 obliges Member States to take 
the necessary measures to ensure that parties are able to obtain access to 
upstream supply networks. The access should be provided in a manner 
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determined by the Member State and in accordance with relevant legal 
instruments (Article 20 Gas Directive 2003). The conditions on which 
refusal of access is allowed stated in Article 21 Gas Directive 2003 are in 
accordance with the conditions mentioned in Gas Directive 1998 (see also 
Article 27 Gas Directive 2003 specifically on the refusal to access in case of 
take-or-pay contracts). Article 22 provides that major new gas 
infrastructures, such as for example interconnectors between Member 
States, may be exempted from the application of Articles 18, 19, 20 and 
25(2), (3) and (4) Gas Directive 2003, subject to certain conditions. 
5.2.2 Designation of system operators 
Gas Directive 1998, obliges transmission, storage, LNG and distribution 
undertakings to refrain from discriminating between different system users, 
and to preserve and refrain from abusing confidentiality of commercially 
sensitive information. Gas Directive 2003 also stipulates confidentiality for 
system operators (Articles 10 and 14 Gas Directive 2003), but in addition, 
goes much further then that and obliges Member States to designate 
transmission system and distribution system operators (Chapter III and IV 
of the Gas Directive 2003). 
 
Article 7 states that Member States shall designate or shall require natural 
gas undertakings which own transmission, storage or LNG facilities to 
designate one or more system operators. The tasks of the transmission, 
storage and/or LNG operators incorporate: a) the operation, maintenance 
and development of secure, reliable and efficient transmission, storage 
and/or LNG facilities; b) non-discrimination between system users or 
classes of system users; c) provision of another operator with sufficient 
information to ensure that the transport and storage of natural gas is 
exercised in a secure and efficient way; d) provision of the information to 
system users which they need in order to access the system in an efficient 
way (Article 7, paragraph 1 Gas Directive 2003). The rules adopted by these 
operators must be objective, transparent and non-discriminatory.  If the 
transmission system operator is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, 
 62 
the transmission activities must be independent at least in terms of legal 
form, organisation and decision making from other non-transmission 
activities (Article 9, paragraph 1 Gas Directive 2003). Paragraph 2 of 
Article 9 stipulates certain minimum criteria which apply in order to ensure 
independence. 
 
Article 11 of the Gas Directive 2003 provides for the designation of 
distribution system operators, in the same way as Article 7 stipulates 
Member States to designate transmission system operators. The tasks of the 
distribution system operator are comparable to the tasks of the transmission 
system operator. Article 13 Gas Directive 2003 stipulates the unbundling 
conditions for distribution system operators. These obligations are identical 
to the ones mentioned in Article 9 concerning the transmission system 
operator. However, with respect to distribution system operators, Member 
States may decide not to apply the legal and organisational unbundling 
obligations, when it concerns integrated natural gas undertakings serving 
less than 100.000 customers. Furthermore, Article 15 Gas Directive 2003, 
stipulates that the rules concerning unbundling of transmission and 
distribution system operators (more specifically, the obligations contained in 
Article 9(1) and 13(1)) shall not prevent the operation of a combined 
transmission, LNG, storage and distribution system operator, which is 
independent from other non-related activities in terms of its legal form, 
organisation and decision making. The combined operation must however 
meet certain requirements stipulated in points a-d of Article 15. 
5.2.3 Eligible customers 
The Gas Directive 2003 does not entail liberalisation of the market through 
a three stage process as the Gas Directive 1998 did. In fact, Gas Directive 
2003 states that all non-household gas customers must be eligible from July 
1
st
 2004 onward, and from July 1
st
 2007, all wholesale and final customers 
of natural gas must be free to choose their gas supplier (Article 23 Gas 
Directive 2003). In addition and in accordance with Gas Directive 1998, 
Member States shall ensure that natural gas undertakings established within 
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their territory supply eligible customers through a direct line (Article 24 Gas 
Directive 2003). 
5.2.4 Public Service Obligations (PSOs) 
In accordance with the Gas Directive 1998, the Gas Directive 2003 allows 
Member States, if they so wish, to impose, in the general economic interest, 
upon undertakings, public service obligations (Article 3 Gas directive 2003). 
As in the prior Gas Directive, these obligations may relate to security of 
supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies, and environmental 
protection. In the new directive however, environmental protection extends 
to include energy efficiency and climate protection. The obligations of 
course have to be clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
verifiable. In addition, the new Directive stresses that PSOs have to 
guarantee equality of access for EU gas companies to national consumers. 
The new directive however specifically incorporates a paragraph 3 within 
Article 3 on consumer protection. The paragraph stipulates that Member 
States must adopt appropriate measure in order to ensure a high degree of 
consumer protection. In particular these measures should protect vulnerable 
consumers and help to avoid their disconnection. Furthermore, Member 
States should ensure that general contract terms and conditions are 
transparent, and that general information and dispute settlement mechanisms 
are available. The measures adopted to fulfil public service obligations 
should be reported to the Commission. Paragraph 4 of Article 3 Gas 
Directive 2003 emphasises that Member States shall implement appropriate 
measures to achieve the objectives of social and economic cohesion, 
environmental protection, and security of supply. 
5.2.5 Authorisation for the operation or construction of new natural gas 
facilities 
Article 4 of the Gas Directive 2003 is formulated in accordance with Article 
4 of Gas Directive 1998. 
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5.2.6 Unbundling and transparency of accounts 
The provisions of Gas Directive 2003 concerning the unbundling and 
transparency of accounts are comparable to the provisions in Gas Directive 
1998. Article 17 Gas Directive 2003 additionally provides that gas 
undertakings shall keep accounts, for other gas activities not relating to 
transmission, distribution, LNG and storage. Until July 2007, the natural gas 
undertakings must keep separate accounts for supply activities for non-
eligible customers. 
5.2.7 Regulatory authorities 
Whilst the Gas Directive 1998 merely provided for the designation of a 
dispute settlement authority, a new provision in Gas Directive 2003 
concerns the appointment by the Member State of a regulatory authority, 
which is not related to the gas industry (Article 24 Gas Directive 2003). The 
regulatory authority is responsible (at least) for ensuring non-discrimination, 
effective competition and efficient functioning of the market. The regulatory 
authority monitors amongst others the unbundling of accounts, the 
allocation of capacity, the publication of information by the different 
operators, the access conditions and levels of transparency and competition 
(Article 25, points a-h). The regulatory authority is responsible for 
approving or/and fixing the methodologies used to calculate or establish 
connection and access to national networks and the provision of balancing 
services. Regulatory authorities may be appointed with the task of 
monitoring the security of supply (Article 5 Gas Directive 2003). In fact, the 
regulatory authorities must contribute to the development of the internal 
market and create a level playing field (Article 25, paragraph 12 Gas 
Directive 2003). 
5.2.8 Derogations 
Apart from several derogations already mentioned in the above paragraphs, 
the new Directive provides for some other derogations. Member States 
which have only one main external supplier (a supplier having a market 
share of more than 75%) and are not directly connected to the system of 
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other Member States, may derogate from the provisions of the Gas Directive 
2003 concerning the construction and operation of natural gas facilities, 
market opening, unbundling and direct lines (Article 28, paragraph 1 Gas 
Directive 2003). When a Member State which can be qualified as an 
emergent market (a market where the first commercial supply under its first 
long-term natural gas supply contract was made less than 10 years 
previously) experiences difficulties related to the implementation of the Gas 
Directive 2003 (and not related to take-or-pay contracts), the Member States 
may derogate from the provisions concerning the construction and operation 
of natural gas facilities, the appointment and unbundling of system 
operators, the unbundling of accounts, TPA, market opening and direct lines 
(Article 28, paragraphs 2 and 3). This derogation is also applicable if in a 
Member State, the implementation of the directive produces substantial 
problems (specifically problems concerning the development of the 
transmission and major distribution infrastructure) in a geographically 
limited area (Article 28, paragraphs 4 and 5 Gas Directive 2003). 
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6 State of implementation in Member States: The Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany 
Various reports
175
 have been drafted on the state of implementation in the 
different Member States. Most reports concern the period before the entry 
into force of the new Gas Directive 2003. In the following paragraphs, the 
structure of the gas market and consequences of the liberalisation process of 
both directives in three different Member States will be discussed: The 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. 
6.1 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands is one of the gas producing countries within the European 
Community.  The natural gas is produced both offshore as well as onshore. 
Due to the fact that production of other hydrocarbons is limited, gas is the 
most important domestic energy source.
176
 The largest gas field in The 
Netherlands is the Groningen field, which was discovered in 1959. Due to 
this field, The Netherlands has been a net exporter of gas since the 1960s. 
6.1.1 The Dutch gas market before liberalisation 
Up to the 1980s, the Dutch energy market was unregulated to a large extent.  
Public regulation was limited to the exploration and production of natural 
gas (upstream market) and the distribution of gas (downstream market). The 
supply of gas was governed by private law agreements without statutory 
legislation. The midstream activities, such as the storage of natural gas and 
                                                 
175
 See amongst others European Commission, Directorate General for Energy and 
Transport, State of implementation of the EU Gas directive 98/30/EC: an overview, state of 
play by the end of May 2000; European Commission, Directorate General Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Report on the functioning of product and capital markets, 07.12.2001, 
Working document by the services of Commissioners Bolkestein and Solbs; European 
Commission, DG TREN Draft working paper: Third benchmarking report on the 
implementation of the internal electricity and gas market, 01.03.2004; DRI-WEFA (2001), 
Report for the European Commission Directorate General for Transport and Energy to 
determine changes after opening of the gas market in August 2000, Volume I: European 
overview; DRI-WEFA (2001), Report for the European Commission Directorate General 
for Transport and Energy to determine changes after opening of the Gas Market in August 
2000, Volume II: Country Reports, July 2001. 
176
 Roggenkamp, M. (2001), Country Report: The Netherlands in Géradin, D. (ed.) (2001), 
The liberalisation of Electricity and natural gas market in the European Union, London: 
Kluwer Law International. 
 67 
the construction of upstream pipelines were governed by a regulatory 
regime which was limited to provisions on safety and environment.  
 
Since 1962, the transmission of gas has been based upon a Policy Note 
issued by Minister De Pous. The Note pleaded (amongst others) for close 
coordination of the purchase and marketing/sales activities within the gas 
sector and the involvement of the Dutch State therein. The influence of the 
Dutch State was realised through the establishment of a partnership (“De 
Maatschap”), which was to take all decisions related to the off-take and the 
production of gas. The Dutch State held 40% of the shares through Energie 
Beheer Nederland (EBN), whilst the Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij 
(NAM) held 60%. NAM (50% Shell and 50% Exxon) had in return been 
granted the concession for the exploitation of the Groningen gas field. As 
such, coordination between purchase and sales activities was achieved as 
most of the aforementioned companies held a stake in the supply company 
NV Nederlandse Gasunie (25% Shell, 25% Exxon, 40% EBN, and 10% 
Dutch State). The main supplier of Gasunie is NAM. In addition, the 
Minister produced the “market-value” principle, on basis of which gas 
should be produced.
177
 This meant that the price of gas sold to the different 
consumers was linked with the price of substitute alternative fuels such as 
oil. Accordingly customers would never pay more nor less for gas than 
alternative fuels. A precondition was that no alternative supplies of low 
priced gas could reach the market. 
 
The Minister had several powers of approval within Gasunie on the basis of 
the afore mentioned private agreement. These rights concerned: “the right of 
approval of a Gas Marketing Plan forecasting Dutch medium and long term 
supply and demand; the right and approval of the conditions and tariffs of 
the delivery of gas in- and outside the Netherlands; the right of approval of 
gas purchasing contracts between Gasunie and suppliers and the right to 
approve plans for the laying of pipelines”.
178
 The upstream market in The 
Netherlands was (in general) liberalised, as diverse companies held 
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concessions for the exploration and production of gas on- and offshore (e.g. 
NAM, Elf Petroland, BP/Amoco, Wintershall and Veba). Almost all 
concessions however, used to stipulate that the gas should be sold to 
Gasunie.
179
 In the 1960s, Gasunie entered into exclusive contracts with the 
energy distribution sector through EnergieNed (an association of 
distribution companies). The contract guaranteed the supply of gas to the 
distributors and secured off-take for Gasunie. In addition, Gasunie held 
shares in two distribution companies.
180
 
 
Up to 1995 The Netherlands had been a strong opponent of liberalisation.
181
 
But since the publishing of the Third Energy Note (Derde Energienota) 
around 1995/1996
182
, Dutch policy has been focused on a larger role for 
market forces and the maintenance of a reliable, affordable and 
environmentally friendly energy supply. Consequently, a shift has taken 
place from a regulated and supply based market to a market primarily 
geared towards demand. Starting point of the new policy are the wishes of 
consumers. Since 1997, the gas distribution in the Netherlands has been 
regulated based on the Energy Distribution Act of 14 December 1996, 
providing rules for the distribution of electricity, gas and heat (Dutch 
Gazette 642). The main tasks stipulated in the Act are providing reliable 
energy supply at low cost, the promotion of safety and the efficient and 
environmentally sound use of energy (Article 2). The Act does not contain 
any supply obligations. The Energy Distribution Act however had no direct 
impact on the gas supply contract between Gasunie and distribution 
companies. Initially the aim was to maintain the structure of the Dutch gas 
industry with a key role for Gasunie and De Maatschap/NAM in order to 
secure scale and organisational advantages and facilitate continued 
coordination of gas sales and purchase from Groningen. 
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6.1.2 The implementation of the EC Gas Directive 1998 
The EC Gas Directive 1998 however, led to the draft of a Gas Bill, which 
was approved by the Second Chamber of Parliament on April 5
th
 2000. The 
bill was accepted by the First Chamber on 20 June 2000 and entered into 
force on the 10
th
 of August 2000. The Gas Act aims at securing the regular 
supply of gas as well as competition. The Gas Act 2000 stipulates that all 
gas undertakings (transmission, storage, LNG) shall operate, maintain and 
develop under economic conditions, secure reliable and efficient facilities 
wit due regard to environment. In accordance with the EC Directive, the 
Gas undertakings must provide other undertakings with sufficient 
information to ensure that the transport and storage of natural gas can take 
place in accordance with the secure and efficient operation of the 
interconnected grid. Gas undertakings must also refrain from discrimination. 
 
The Gas Act 2000, is based upon a gradual market opening as stipulated by 
the EC Directive. However, directly eligible are only those customers which 
consume more than 10 million m3 of gas per year
183
, as such 44% of the 
market will be directly liberalised as opposed to the 20% as stipulated by 
EC Gas Directive 1998. The second category of eligible customers consists 
of undertakings using more than 1 million m3 of gas per year, but less than 
10 million m3. These customers will be eligible as from January 1
st
 2002. 
On January 1
st
 2004, all customers consuming less than 1 million m3 of gas 
per year will be eligible (Article 1 Gas Act). During the transition period 
(period till January 1
st
 2004), the customers not yet considered eligible are 
referred to as “protected customers”. These customers enjoy legislative 
protection as distribution companies have an obligation to supply these 
customers based on a tariff set by the Minister (Article 26 Gas Act 2000).  
Article 21 and 22 of the Gas Act require (during the transitional period) gas 
undertakings to apply for a license in order to supply natural gas to 
protected customers. The Gas Act also contains provisions which regulate 
the supply of gas to households after January 1
st
 2004: e.g. suppliers must 
take care of the supply of gas upon reasonable terms and conditions. In the 
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transitional period in fact two markets exists: a liberalized gas market for 
large and medium sized consumers for which there are no licensing 
requirements, and a non-liberalized (regulated) market for protected 
consumers.
184
 
 
Gasunie acquires specific duties on basis of the Gas Act (public service 
obligations) (Articles 53-57 Gas Act): 1) the obligation to purchase gas from 
the Groningen field, 2) obligation to purchase gas at request of producers 
from other fields according to reasonable conditions and market-value 
prices 3) obligation to submit annually a forecast of Dutch supply and 
demand for the next 20 years. Gasunie can be exempt from these obligations 
if it would suffer financial or economic difficulties as a result of the task. 
The Minster can give Gasunie explicit instructions in order to carry out its 
specific task. 
 
The EC directive merely requires the unbundling of accounts (Article 32). 
However, in line with the Dutch Electricity Act, the Gas Act requires gas 
undertakings to be split up into legally independent gas transmission 
companies (network managers) and supply companies (licence holders). As 
such, regional exploitation activities will be legally separated of supply 
activities (Articles 2-9 Gas Act). The local distribution companies were split 
up into gas suppliers and network operators providing regulatory access 
accordingly. The legal unbundling is aimed at guaranteeing objective and 
transparent access by third parties and the security of supply. Gasunie is 
exempted from this obligation. However Gasunie must unbundle its 
accounts for transmission, distribution and storage and non-gas activities. 
Accordingly, Gasunie has separated its high pressure transport and storage 
facilities from its trading activities, through the establishment of a Chinese 
wall. In addition as of January 1
st
 2002, Gasunie has, on its own initiative, 
committed to an organisational split-up of its sales and transport activities 
and is possibly aiming at a legal split-up. With this organisational split-up, 
Gasunie has gone beyond the obligations as stated in the EC Gas Directive 
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1998 and the Gas Act 2000. In accordance with EC Gas Directive 1998, the 
Gas Act requires natural gas undertakings to ascertain the confidentiality of 
information they receive. In addition, gas undertakings may not abuse the 
information obtained in transport negotiations. 
 
The Gas Directive 1998 allows Member States to choose between the 
systems of regulated and negotiated access to the system (TPA). The Gas 
Act prescribes a combination of regulated access and negotiated access. 
Regulatory access will apply at the distribution level (for captive customers 
until 2004 and optional for consumers using less than 170.000 m3 of gas per 
year after 2004). Regulated access means that the access will be subject to 
regulatory control and based upon the publication of indicative tariffs and 
terms for transport and ancillary related activities. Negotiated access and the 
competition rules are applicable to upstream pipelines. The negotiated 
access has however, become increasingly regulated: indicative 
transportation tariffs (which must be reasonable and non-discriminatory) 
can only be set on the basis of guidelines issued by the Dienst Uitvoering en 
Toezicht Energie “DTe”. The DTe is a commission which resorts under the 
Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, and is a chamber of the Netherlands 
Competition Authority (NMa). The rules on negotiated access also apply to 
the storage facilities, as long as the respective storage facility has a 
dominant position (Gasunie, NAM, Amoco). NAM and Amoco however, 
can be required to present indicative tariffs on the basis of which they can 
negotiate TPA with third parties, including Gasunie. 
 
There is no obligations regarding the connection between pipelines. Dutch 
undertakings are able to freely construct and exploit competitive pipelines. 
The connection of production facilities to the grid (production pipelines) 
however, is dependent upon the capacity of the grid. 
 
The Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Netherlands Competition 
Authority “NMa”) has been designated by the Gas Act as the competent 
dispute settlement authority, and is entitled to mediate disputes relating to 
the access and the refusal of access. The NMa has placed its supervisory and 
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enforcement activities under the Dte which accordingly has been charged 
with the supervision of the compliance of undertakings with the Gas Act 
2000 (Article 59). 
 
The Gas Act 2000 abolishes the monopolies of the transmission companies, 
but applies a less rigorous system to the distribution sector. In fact, the Gas 
Act gives Gasunie a legal basis for a monopoly position. It will hence be 
difficult to introduce competition, as the supply of gas is restricted: Dutch 
gas is generally contracted to Gasunie, whereas the supply of external gas 
sources are limited (Norway, Russia, Algeria). The gas sector is in need of a 
proactive regulator and regulated access to gas networks as shown by the 
US and UK. 
 
6.1.3 The implementation of the EC Gas Directive 2003 
The Dutch government is one of the first Member States to have amended 
its Gas Act 2000 in accordance with the new Gas Directive 2003. On the 9
th
 
of September 2004, the Gas Act 2004 was published in the Dutch 
Gazette.
185
 As the Gas Act 2000 merely designated the natural gas 
undertakings to split up into independent transmission undertakings and 
supply undertakings, the Gas Act 2004 stipulates the designation of 
transmission system operators. These operators must be appointed by the 
owner of the transmission network. This transmission system operator must 
be independent of an undertaking which is concerned with the production, 
purchase or supply of gas (Articles 2-9 Gas Act 2004).The appointment of a 
system operator is subject to authorisation by the Minister of Economic 
Affairs.  The transmission system operator must fulfil certain conditions 
specified in the Act. Duties of the operator include the security of quality, 
reliability and capacity of supply. According to Article 5a Gas Act 2004, the 
Minister may impose PSOs on the transmission system operator. Article 9a 
of the Gas Act 2004 stipulates that the owner of a gas storage installation 
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must also appoint an operator of the respective storage facilities. The duties 
are similar in scope to the duties of the transmission system operator. 
 
TPA is based upon regulated access, unless refusal of access is allowed due 
to particular conditions (Article 15-16 Gas Act 2004, such as absence of 
capacity etc, see Gas Directive 2003), transmission operators must grant 
access to the network and related services (Article 14). Article 12 Gas Act 
2004 stipulates that tariffs will be set by Ministerial decree. The director of 
the Dte (after negotiations with the system operators) will authorise the 
tariff and conditions, which must be objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory. An exemption to apply the tariffs and conditions may be 
granted by the director of the Dte. The storage of gas is still in the hands of 
incumbent monopolists. However, the storage undertaking must negotiate 
storage facilities with another company if it so requests (Article 18c). 
 
As stipulated in the former Gas act, Gas Act 2004 obliges the unbundling of 
accounts of transport, storage, and related activities. 
 
Articles 34-37 concern the fact that gas undertakings must provide the Dte 
and other competent authorities with information if they so wish. System 
operators must guarantee the confidentiality of commercially sensitive 
information and refrain from discrimination between users. 
 
Article 43 stipulates that natural gas undertakings supplying gas to final 
users who consume less than 170.000 m3 of gas per year are subject to a 
license which will be issued by the Minister of Economic Affairs (Article 43 
Gas Act 2004). Gasunie remains subject to certain PSOs (Articles 53-57). 
 
Articles 52b Gas Act 2004 specifically concern consumer protection. As 
such it is prohibited to apply unfair and misleading sales methods for supply 
and transmission of gas. Conditions in the transmission, and supply 
agreement must be clear, transparent and known beforehand. Customers 
must at all times be able to access the transparent information concerning 
tariffs and conditions. 
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Surveillance as regards the implementation and enforcement of the Gas Act 
2004 is divided between the Director General of the NMa and the director of 
the Dte (Articles 59-60b Gas Act 2004). 
6.1.4 Changes and welfare effects on the Dutch gas market 
Dutch liberalisation had a slow start however, it is currently one of the first 
Member States to have transposed the new EC Directive 2003 into national 
legislation.  
 
Whilst Gasunie remains the incumbent transmission undertaking, Essent 
(originally an electricity producer and supplier) has a built pipeline in 
cooperation with Delta (a local distribution company) for its own gas needs 
and to supply eligible and non-eligible customers. As such, Essent competes 
directly with the Gasunie transmission division. Gas Transport Services 
(GTS), which is related to Gasunie, has been appointed as transmission 
system operator.  
 
Mid 2000, new entrants argued that TPA prices were much higher than 
transport prices for customers supplied exclusively by Gasunie’s 
commercial branch, which leads to a distortion of competition. In order to 
be competitive an entrant had to have a very low gas price whilst it can only 
buy gas abroad as the existent national fields are nearly fully contracted for. 
The complaints were based upon the fact that Gasunie applies a Commodity 
Service System (CSS) which distinguishes between two classes of 
customers:  1) Gasunie offers a single supplier off-take contract  to those 
customers supplied exclusively by Gasunie’s commercial branch and 2) a 
multiple supplier off-take contract is offered to customers choosing to buy 
gas from other suppliers (either a mixed off-take from Gasunie and a third 
party or an exclusive third party). In 2001, complaints from within the gas 
sector led the NMa to start an investigation into the CSS. On 4 April 2002, 
the NMa concluded that parts of the CSS allowed Gasunie to abuse her 
dominant position on the market for natural gas transmission. Gasunie has 
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in accordance replaced the CSS by a system of negotiated access based on 
indicative tariffs and conditions. 
 
According to the Gas Act 2000, natural gas undertakings operating storage 
facilities (NAM, BP Amoco, Gasunie) are required to give new parties 
access to these facilities. However, the capacity of BP Amoco and NAM is 
currently tied up in long-term contracts with Gasunie. Gasunie does offer 
storage arrangements, however third parties cannot evaluate if these 
agreements are truly cost reflective. 
 
Despite the numerous complaints, the presence of new suppliers on the 
Dutch market is amongst the highest in the Member States. Fifteen new 
shippers (trading companies) have entered the market, which offer 70/75 
different shipper contracts to supply eligible clients. TPA amounted to 22% 
in 2000. Of the gas transported through the grid, 8% was carried by TPA 
after August 2000, and this amounted to 17% in March 2001. With the TPA 
tariffs published, 50 end-users had switched to new suppliers by the end of 
the year 2000. In the Netherlands, a modest price reduction has taken place 
due to actual switching and the threat of switching. Gradually, Dte has 
published conditions for market parties. 
 
In 2001, the Dutch market did not yet resemble a true European level 
playing field, however, large gas customers were in general satisfied with 
the supply of gas and the provision of service by natural gas undertakings. 
 
The new EC Gas Directive 2003 and consequently the new Dutch Gas Act 
2004, competitiveness of the market will be enhanced. On first day of full 
market opening (1 January 2004) 9000 households had switched already 
switched, one month later, 36000 gas customers or 0,5 percent of the 
residential market had switched.
186
 In addition, the DTe has published new 
2005 Guidelines concerning the Transport of Gas. In these guidelines the 
DTe takes several measures: 1) the transportation-costs of gas will 
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incorporate part of the quality-conversion costs. As such all parties will 
contribute to these costs and a level playing field will be created; 2) GTS 
will have to introduce a new balancing system in 2006, in order to allow an 
efficient use of the Dutch transmission system; 3) GTS will have to publish 
and make information available to third parties regarding (available) import 
capacities. In this manner parties will know whether capacity is available. 
 
According to a recent press-statement of the DTe (21.12.2004), the total 
transport costs for consumers concerning electricity and gas will fall with 
Euro 82 million in 2005. For a household with an average gas use of 1815 
m3 and electricity use of 3375 KWh per year, this means a reduction in 
energy costs of 4,3%. More specifically, the transport tariffs for domestic 
gas use will fall with 8,6 %. This decrease in costs is due to the reduction 
schemes which DTe prescribes and the fact that GTS has lowered all 
transport related tariffs with an average of 5% over 2003 and 2004. It seems 
that liberalisation has begun to have appreciable effects for domestic users.  
6.2 Belgium  
Due to the Federal structure in Belgium, the implementation of the EC Gas 
Directives on the internal market in natural gas require action by the Federal 
and each of the three regional authorities: Flanders, Wallonia and 
Brussels.
187
 With regard to the gas sector, each government is responsible 
for matters falling within their substantive (and geographic) jurisdiction. 
Federal law, however does not per se prevail over regional law in areas 
which are regulated by Federal law.
188
 With respect to the gas sector, the 
regional authorities are concerned with the public gas distribution, i.e. 
supply of natural gas via the distribution systems. The jurisdiction of the 
Federal state extends to areas which have to be assessed on a national level 
due to the technical and economic integration required by these matters. 
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Federal jurisdiction of the gas sector extends to matters concerning the 
transport and production of energy, and the regulation of prices.  
6.2.1 Belgium gas market before liberalisation 
In contrast to the Netherlands, which is one of the producers of natural gas, 
Belgium is an importer of natural gas. In 2000 for example, 646.460 terra 
joule of natural gas was imported from Algeria (26,8%), the Netherlands 
(33,3%), Norway (33,3%), Germany (2%) and other European countries 
(4,6%).
189
 Belgium imports natural gas, which is then stored in underground 
facilities. Liberalisation will entail a radical change from the way the 
Belgian gas market was structured in the past. In 1965 the Federal Gas Law 
entered into force, subjecting the Belgian gas sector to statutory legislation. 
The market remained however, characterised by monopolies. Before the 
liberalisation process was inflicted upon the sector, the gas market for 
transport and underground storage was dominated by an incumbent 
monopolist
190
 “Distrigas” (controlled by the French Suez group).
191
 The 
distribution of gas was carried out by municipalities. Whilst there was no 
statutory provision which granted the municipalities a distribution 
monopoly, such monopoly automatically derived from the fact that the 
municipalities were assigned with the exclusive right to regulate.
192
 The 
municipalities exercised their distribution duties through associations of 
municipalities. An important role was also played by the Control Committee 
for Electricity and Gas (CCEG). The CCEG was composed of 
representatives of the social partners
193
 (the federal and regional government 
were not a member), as such, the CCEG assumed the role of a controlling 
entity: delivering binding recommendations to the gas and electricity sector. 
Maximum price recommendations for example, were adopted in ministerial 
decrees pursuant to general price control legislation. The liberalisation of 
the gas markets induced by the Gas Directives has required the competences 
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of the CCEG to be reduced to the non-liberalised sectors of the gas market. 
As a matter of fact, from July 1
st
 2003 onwards, the responsibilities of the 
CCEG have been entirely taken over by the Commission for Regulation of 
Electricity and Gas (CREG)
194
, which is independent of the government and 
social partners. 
6.2.2 Implementation of EC Gas Directive 1998 
In accordance with the liberalisation goals of EC Gas Directive 1998, the 
Federal Gas Law of April 29
th
 1999
195
 has been adopted which implements 
the Gas Directive 1998. The Federal Gas Law concerns those areas of the 
directive, which fall within federal jurisdiction: the operation and 
construction of gas transmission facilities, the supply of gas, access to the 
transmission system and third party access. The Federal Gas Law is 
executed by implementing decrees that further specify the regulatory 
framework, in order to correctly apply the law. Only a limited number of 
provisions of law had entered into effect on June 15
th
 1999
196
 however, 
gradually other provisions entered into force by Royal Decree.
197
 The 
Federal Gas Law of 1999 was amended by the of 26 July 2001
198
, which had 
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two main effects: the pace of opening was accelerated and negotiated TPA 
was replaced by regulated TPA. 
 
The Federal Gas Law subjects the construction and operation of gas 
transmission facilities to the issuance of a permit by the Federal energy 
minister. Such a permit is only necessary if the facilities are intended for 
certain forms of supply (Article 2 Federal Gas Act): (amongst others) the 
supply of gas distribution companies; supply of final customers consuming 
on a permanent basis at least 1 million m3 of gas per year; the transit 
through Belgium of gas.
199
 The other forms of gas transport hence fall 
within the scope of distribution (generally defined as the supply of gas via 
local pipeline networks to customers established in the territory of one or 
more municipalities
200
) and are subject to the regional legislation. The 
transmission companies must maintain and develop facilities under 
economically acceptable conditions with due regard to the environment. In 
accordance with the EC Gas Directive 1998, transmission undertaking must 
refrain from discriminating between different classes of system users. 
  
The Federal Gas Law designates the following eligible customers: - 
producers of electricity for the quantities of gas needed for electricity 
generation; final customers connected to transmission system and 
consuming at least 25 million m3 of natural gas per year (total market 
opening of 47%). This threshold is to be reduced to 15 million m3 of gas per 
year on 10 August 2003 (49% market opening) and to 5 million m3 of gas 
per year on 1 October 2006 (66% market opening). The distribution 
companies shall be eligible for the quantities of natural gas used by 
customers designated by the regional authorities as eligible within the 
distribution network. Irrespective of this threshold, as of October 2006 the 
distribution companies shall be eligible for 33% of the balance of their 
requirements. On 10 October 2010 all customers and distributors will be 
eligible. The Federal Act in 2001 had speeded up market opening and on 
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31
st
 December 2003 all final customers connected to the transmission 
network and consuming 5 million m3 of gas per year were eligible, whilst 
all final customers connected to the gas network will be eligible on 1 
October 2006. A Royal Decree of 3 December 2003
201
 abolishes the 
obligation imposed upon final customers wishing to become eligible in the 
natural gas transmission network to submit an application for eligibility to 
the Minister. Final customers who consume more than 5 million m3 of gas 
per year, automatically become eligible as soon as they have reached this 
level of consumption. 
 
Initially, the Belgian authorities opted for a system of negotiated access for 
transmission. However, the amendment to the Federal Gas Law 1999 has 
introduced regulated third party access, base upon recommendation of the 
CREG (rapport 2000). According to CREG regulated TPA entails increased 
transparency and non-discrimination of access. The application of regulated  
tariffs will ensure competition before and after transmission. In this light, 
the transmission companies are obliged to publish annually their main 
commercial conditions concerning the use of the network. These main 
commercial conditions shall be approved by the CREG. In accordance with 
the EC Gas Directive 1998, transmission undertakings can refuse access in 
the case of insufficient capacity, if access prevents the proper performance 
of PSOs or when access causes economic and financial difficulties due to 
take-or-pay contracts concluded prior to 1 January 1998. Refusal however, 
must be justified and refusal of access based upon take-or-pay contract is 
subject to authorisation of the CREG till 1 October 2006. In addition, a code 
of conduct regulating the access to the network is issued by Royal 
Decree.
202
 The code of conduct outlines amongst others, the details 
regarding access procedures, requirements for the exchange of information 
(i.e. the information network users must make available to transmission 
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companies), the measures transmission companies must take in order to 
preserve confidentiality and prevent discrimination, and the period within 
which natural gas undertakings are obliged to respond to access requests. 
Natural gas undertakings must unbundle their accounts as regards 
transmission, distribution and storage activities as well as non-gas activities. 
As such, the Belgian authorities do not seem to go beyond the minimum 
requirements of unbundling. However, on 30 November 2001 Distrigas, 
Belgium’s main incumbent, split its activities (legal unbundling) which are 
incorporated into two distinct companies. Fluxys NV will act as 
transmission system operator, whilst Distrigas is concerned with the trading 
and import activities. The legal unbundling was formerly advised by CREG 
(rapport 2000) in order to allow for increased cost transparency and prevent 
discriminatory treatment of third parties and the abuse of a dominant 
position. 
 
The Federal government may impose PSOs by way of Royal Decree upon 
holders of transmission permits as regards investments made for the benefit 
of ineligible customers and on the holders of supply permits as regards the 
regulatory, security and quality of supply, in order to protect the supply of 
the non-eligible customers. 
 
The system of price controls (maximum price recommendations) as 
formerly issued by the CCEG and since the liberalisation taken over by the 
CREG, remains applicable to non-eligible customers. The Federal Minister 
may declare the system of price controls applicable to eligible customers, 
but is not obliged to do so. The setting of maximum prices is aimed at 
preventing cross-subsidisation and to ensure that a fair share of the benefits 
of liberalisation accrue to both private and professional end-users by way of 
price reductions. This seems to comply with allocative efficiency aims and 
correspondingly with the goal of consumer welfare.  
 
As already mentioned in the above paragraphs, the CREG is the competent 
authority designated by the Belgian government, with an advisory, 
monitoring and controlling role. In addition to the publication of binding 
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price recommendations, approval of main commercial conditions and 
control of the application of rules regarding refusal to access, the CREG in 
general monitors the compliance with the Federal Gas Law. Furthermore, 
the CREG advises the Federal government on matters regarding the 
operation and organisation of markets. Besides this Federal authority, the 
regional authorities have set up their own agencies modelled upon the 
CREG, to regulate and supervise activities within their own regions. There 
are two regional authorities: De Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de 
Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt (VREG), which is responsible for the regulation 
and control of electricity and gas in Flanders, and De Waalse 
Energiecommissie (CWAPE), which is responsible for the regulation and 
control of gas in the Walloon region. 
 
The Flemish regional authorities were the first to adopt a decree in order to 
implement the EC Gas Directive 1998. The Flemish Natural Gas Decree 
was passed by the Flemish authorities on 6 July 2001.
203
 The decree 
stipulates that the on January 1
st
 2003 those customers whose consumption 
exceeds 1 million m3 of gas per year will become eligible and on 1 July 
2003 all other customers connected to the distribution network in Flanders 
will be declared eligible. The Flemish decree stipulates that VREG will 
designate an independent distribution system operator (Articles 4-7 Gas 
decree). The independent system operator must take care to maintain, 
develop and exploit the distribution network (Article 8 Gas decree). In 
accordance with EC Directives, the distribution system operator must 
refrain from discrimination and maintain confidentiality of commercially 
sensitive information received from its customers. The designation of an 
independent distribution system operator (and thus the legal unbundling 
between the operation and distribution network on the one hand and the sale 
of natural gas to eligible end users on the other hand) predecesses EC Gas 
Directive 2003. The VREG will establish a  technical regulation concerning 
the control and access of the distribution network and the conditions as 
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regards the construction of direct lines (Article 9 Gas decree). In addition, 
the VREG issues a code of conduct similar to the one issued by the CREG. 
Access to the distribution network occurs on a basis of regulated access and 
the system operator will publish the corresponding access tariffs and tariffs 
for related services (Article 12 Gas decree). Access may however be denied 
subject conditions which are in accordance with EC legislation. Supply is 
subject to a permit, which is issued by VREG. In accordance with the 
Federal Gas Law, the VREG may impose PSOs. The Flemish decree 
incorporates a provisions on environmentally friendly and efficient energy 
use. 
 
The decree of the Wallonia region was adopted on 19 December 2002
204
. 
Since then the decree has been amended by a new decree of 18 December 
2003
205
 and a ruling of the Belgium Court of arbitration which annulled 
Article 10, paragraph 3 of the decree.
206
 The Walloon decree also designates 
an independent distribution system operator, which can be a commune. 
However, 51% of the shares of the operator must be owned by the 
municipality or the Provincial authorities.  As in the Flemish decree, the 
system operator must take care to exploit, maintain and develop the 
distribution network. In exercising its duties, the system operator must 
maintain confidentiality of commercially sensitive information gained 
during negotiations. The regulatory authority, CWAPE, will issue a 
technical regulation concerning the control of the distribution network and 
access to the corresponding network. Access to the network is governed by 
regulated access and the distribution system operator must publish its access 
tariffs as well as the tariffs for corresponding services. Access to the 
network may be denied subject to conditions which are in accordance with 
the EC Gas Directives. The decree stipulates that final customers consuming 
more than 20 GWh of gas per year (+/- 1 million m3 of gas per year) will 
become eligible as of 4 January 2004. The supply of gas is subject to a 
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licence to be issued by the government upon advise of the CWAPE. In 
addition, the government may impose PSOs upon advise of the CWAPE. 
 
No legislation has yet entered into force for the Brussels-Capital Region. 
6.2.3 Implementation of EC Directive 2003 
The Federal government has not yet amended the Federal Gas Law in 
accordance with the EC Gas Directive 2003. On 17 November 2004, the 
CREG published an advice containing recommendations with respect to the 
compliance of Belgium law with the new EC Gas Directive 2003. The 
adjustments will be implemented through the adoption of two different 
proposals of law in which the Belgium government hopes to balance the 
Belgium obligations with regard to implementation of the new EC Gas 
Directive and the measures which are necessary to enhance competition in 
the Belgium market. 
 
In general, the CREG concludes that not many adjustments have to be 
made, as the Belgium legislation concerning liberalisation of the gas sector 
already largely complies with the new EC Directive 2003, for example with 
respect to legal unbundling, regulated access, and the designation of 
regulatory authorities. Some of the recommendations made by the CREG 
are the following: 1) the presently maintained tariffs must be reviewed with 
an eye on long term tariffs; 2) the competences of the CREG must be 
enlarged in order to allow responsibility for non-discrimination and actual 
competition; 3) the timeframe within which decisions concerning the 
approval procedure for pipeline access are adopted, has to be extended; 4) 
the different types of calculation methods for tariffs must not be mixed; the 
cost-plus system guarantees an efficient use of the network. 
6.2.4 Changes and welfare effects on the Belgium gas market 
Liberalisation of the Belgian gas market was slow to start up in relation to 
other Member States. In 2000, less than 50% of the Belgian gas market was 
liberalised,  compared with 100% liberalisation in Germany and 45% 
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liberalisation in The Netherlands (with anticipated liberalisation of 100% in 
2004)
207
. According to Federal law, all final customers connected to the 
transmission network will become eligible on 1 October 2006. On July 1
st
 
2003, all customers in the Flemish region have become eligible, and on 1 
January 2004, all final customers connected to a distribution network 
consuming over 1 million m3 of gas per year will become eligible within the 
Walloon region. The earlier Belgian act was absent of real Chinese walls 
between trading and transport activities, access was based upon negotiated 
access and tariffs were inflexible as they were point-to-point based. In 
addition, demand was largely covered by take-or-pay contracts. The diverse 
amendments however, have put current Belgium legislation concerning the 
gas market, ahead of European legislation. In fact, in many aspects, the 
current Federal Belgium Gas Act and the corresponding regional legislation, 
already fulfil the obligations recently formulated in the new EC Gas 
Directive 2003. The liberalisation process has substantially modified the 
Belgian gas market structure and operations.  
 
In 2002 only two companies imported gas: Distrigas (98,5%) and GdF. In 
2003, 14 permits concerning the distribution of gas to big customers had 
been demanded under Federal authority, and 11 have been given.
208
 
Furthermore, the Federal Minister granted seven supply authorisations in 
2003, and fourteen holders of an authorisation are now entitled to access the 
natural gas transmission network.
209
 Separation has been introduced by 
Distrigas between the transport activities on the one hand and natural gas 
trade on the other hand. As a result, Fluxys is presently responsible for the 
Belgian gas transmission. Third party access tariffs and conditions are made 
available on the corresponding websites. The CREG has published a code of 
conduct which regulates the behaviour of the natural gas undertakings. The 
Belgian government states that the monopoly position of Fluxys concerning 
the transmission of gas allows considerable investments, and is thus 
preferred over competition at the moment. Due to the legal unbundling and 
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introduction of competition, Distrigas has lost volume since the beginning 
of the liberalisation process. Most eligible buyers in Belgium, some with 
short term supply contracts, were able to break the monopoly of the 
Belgium gas market. Eligible clients recognize the change in the incumbents 
behaviour: “Distrigaz’s transport system is very open, has a very liberalized 
mind […] strict and conservative behaviour of traditional supplier turned 
more and more customer friendly in recent years, increased flexibility in 
applying some contractual agreements such as pricing, capacity nomination 
and peak management.”
210
 TPA has switched from negotiated to regulated 
access, and as a result Fluxys reduced its access costs to the network by plus 
minus 7% in 2002 and plus minus 6% in 2003. These tariffs are amongst the 
lowest in the EU. The effective implementation of regulated TPA, the 
access to storage facilities for all players, the price reductions, and the 
shortening of contract lengths, has led to a substantial reduction of entry 
barriers and as a result to increased competition. 
 
In 2002, 58% of the Belgian demand for natural gas could be satisfied by 
the free choice of supplier.
211
 On January 2003 this became 65%, taking into 
account the eligibility of final users (whose consumption exceeds 1 million 
m3 of gas per year) connected to the distribution network in Flanders. This 
rate rose to 83% on 1 July 2003, when all other customers connected to the 
distribution network in Flanders were declared eligible. 
 
The Belgian gas prices are amongst the lowest in Europe, and a constant fall 
in prices has been noted since the second quarter of 2003.
212
 The gas prices 
in Belgium may thus be characterised as favourable and reductions in the 
price recommendations made by the former CCEG have increased 
competitiveness. The networks have been extended with a total of 2,100 km 
of distribution pipelines laid in 2003. In 2003, 280 million of Euro had been 
invested in transport, storage and gas distribution infrastructure. Publiclear 
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has been established, which is a clearing house in order to enable free 
exchange of data necessary in liberalised markets. Furthermore, in order to 
ensure the confidentiality of metering information, the combined Managers 
of the natural gas distribution network (GRDs) have set up a metering 
company “INEXIS” which is responsible for collecting, processing and 
sending metering information to the parties in the market who are entitled to 
it. The PSOs imposed upon natural gas undertakings have led to a financial 
contribution of 3 million Euro per year to provide for the funds in order to 
execute their tasks concerning the help to  customers in difficulties.  The 
total fees make up charges in excess of 25 million Euro a year, which could 
create a distortion of competition specifically in relation to the market for 
petrol products, which is not subject to such financial contributions. 
 
It seems that liberalisation of the gas market in Belgian has the desired 
effects. Prices have fallen and transparency and non-discrimination 
concerning access to the network are realised. The legal unbundling of 
Distrigas has led to increased competition in the areas of storage and 
distribution. However the Belgian government should be careful as to the 
fees which Belgian gas undertakings must pay with regard to their PSOs, 
these fees could have a negative effect on the liberalisation process and 
inter-state trade. In addition, the fact that the characterisation of eligible 
customers in the diverse region are divergent may impede liberalisation and 
the switching of suppliers from different regions. In the Walloon region 
communal and provincial authorities still hold a great stake in supply 
undertakings, which might distort fair chances for private companies. 
 
The real effects of total liberalisation in accordance with EC Directive 2004 
will only become apparent during the next few years. 
6.3 Germany 
Germany supplies 19% of its natural gas from its own gas field in Raum. 
The other gas supplies are imported from Russia (31%), The Netherlands 
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(17%), Norway (26%) and Great Britain, Denmark and others (7%).
213
 Due 
to the size of the German economy within the Community, the German 
energy markets represent a substantial and important part of the EU energy 
sector. 
6.3.1 German gas market before liberalisation induced by the EC214 
Before entry into force of the EC directives concerning liberalisation, the 
German markets were in general not subject to regulation. Limited sector-
specific regulation did nevertheless apply to distribution systems of the gas 
and electricity markets. This limited regulation has been induced by the 
characteristics of these network markets, namely the fact that they are 
characterised by natural monopolies. The partial regulation was based upon 
the Energy Business Act
215
 which was aimed at the provision of cheap and 
safe energy. The goals of this act (amongst others) entailed the prevention of 
harmful competition and correspondingly the introduction of a regulatory 
system which as able to take into account the network structure of the 
respective industries. As competition was deemed harmful for certain parts 
of the energy markets, closed territories of exclusive supply were permitted. 
However, in order to refrain incumbent monopolists from demanding 
excessive prices and decreasing consumer welfare, prices were administered 
by public authorities.
216
 These regulated cost-based prices also prevented 
below-cost pricing, which would jeopardize security of supply. As part of 
the sector was regulated, the energy markets were partially exempt from the 
                                                 
213
 Bundesverband der Deutschen Gas und Wasserwirtschaft (BGW), Das Magazin, Annual 
Report 2003. 
214
 Information is based upon the article by Börner, A-R. (2001), Country Report: Germany 
in Géradin, D. (ed.) (2001), The liberalisation of Electricity and natural gas market in the 
European Union, London: Kluwer Law International. 
215
 Gesetz zur Förderung der Energiewirtschaft (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) of 13 December 
1935, Reichsgesetzblatt 1935, Part I, 1451, in the version of 19 December 1977, 
Bundesgesetzblatt 1977, Part I 2750; see also the Energiesicherungsgesetz (Energy 
Safeguard Act) of 21 December 1974, Bundesgesetzblatt 1974, Part I, 3681, in the version 
of 29 December 1979, Bundesgesetzblatt 1979, Part I, 2305. Durchführungsverordnung 
(Second Implementing Decree of The Energy safeguard Act, which is about technical 
safety) of 14 January 1987, Bundesgesetzblatt 1987, Part I, 146. 
216
 Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Gasversorgung von Tarifkunden 
(AVBGasV – Regulation on the general terms and conditions of gas supply to tariff 
customers) of 21 June 1979, Bundesgesetzblatt 1979, Part I, 676 as amended on 25 
September 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt 1990, Part I, 2106; Bundestarifordnung Gas (BTOGAs 
– Federal Tariff Order on gas) of 26 November 1959, Bundesgesetzblatt 1959, Part I, 46, in 
the version of 21 June 1979, Bundesgesetzblatt 1979, Part I, 676. 
 89 
general competition rules.
217
 The German antitrust act allowed for a system 
of concession contracts. The concession indicates that the right to conclude 
sales contracts with final customers does not need to be conferred by public 
authorities, the latter do not even have an exclusive property right which 
they could transfer. Municipalities however, own the municipal roads and 
are able to grant easement for the construction and operation of gas 
pipelines for example. As a compensation for the easement, the 
municipalities receive a payment which is related to the intensity of the 
disturbance caused. In addition, they may ask for a participation fee, the law 
thus allows regular payments related to the off-take of energy units by final 
users.
218
 This payment in particular is regarded as a compensation for the 
easement and is referred to as “concession”. The Antitrust Act also allowed 
restrictive agreements to be concluded. However, strict merger control did 
apply to the gas market, especially regards transactions between monopoly 
players. 
 
The above regime secured the supply of gas in Germany for more than fifty 
years and provided support for about 700 companies, seventeen gas-trading 
companies and about 680 local distributors. 
6.3.2 Implementation of EC Gas Directive 1998 
The EC Gas Directive 1998 however, needed to be implemented and 
rendered German authorities critical of the existing system, specifically in 
the light of consumer welfare. As a result, the Energy Industry Act of 29 
April 1998
219
 and amendments of the GWB (Article 19.4.4of GWB) 
implemented large parts of the Gas Directive. As restrictions were 
completely abolished, the German legislator at once fully liberalised the gas 
and electricity markets. From a legal point of view, all barriers to 
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competition were repealed; the gas market is thus fully open to competition 
and remains subject only to the competition rules as applicable in Germany. 
The concession agreements as mentioned above, were held to guarantee the 
supply of services of general interest and fell within the scope of Article 
86(2) EC Treaty. With the liberalisation of the energy markets, the 
Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office)
220
 took the lead in defining 
markets and concepts of market dominance. On the basis of the provisions 
concerning the abuse of a dominant position, the Federal Cartel Office aims 
to ensure TPA.  
 
The main supplier of natural gas on the German market is the Russian 
Gazprom, which has the policy of selling exclusively to larger German 
companies. In August 2000, five undertakings dominated the transmission 
market: Ruhrgas, is the largest of these undertakings and owns a large share 
of the high pressure transmission system; Wingas (65% of the shares are 
owned by Wintershall and 35% by Gazprom) controls a parallel network of 
pipelines which transmit imported gas from east to west Germany (Wingas 
supplies a high proportion of Germany); VNG is active in the former east 
German states (the largest shareholder is Ruhrgas); BEB (owned 50% by 
Shell and 50% by Esso) is a major national producer; RWE/Thyssengas 
(REW is one of the two very large electricity companies and has a 
controlling interest of 75% in Thyssengas). It becomes apparent that many 
links exist between the diverse undertakings (these links are however, 
closely watched by the Federal Cartel Office). These companies sell a large 
share of their gas to regional or communal distributors, and additionally 
directly to final consumers. Thirty companies dominate the market for 
regional transport and Germany has 700 Stadtwerke or local distributors. 
Many links also exist between the large importing/purchasing companies 
and the Stadtwerke. The gas market is characterised by long term supply 
agreements which usually extend beyond 2025. 
 
                                                 
220
 The Bundeskartellamt was established in 1957. 
 91 
The German access system is based upon negotiated TPA. The negotiated 
access is based upon main commercial conditions, which in 2000 were 
being negotiated by the associations (Verbändevereinbarung). A draft set of 
main principles for a future Association Agreement was signed on 17 March 
2000. The definitive Association Agreement was signed in June 2000 
(Verbändevereinbarung zum Netzzugang bei Erdgas or “VV”).
221
 The VV 
has been amended several times since then.
222
 In May 2002 the VV II Plus 
was signed, to be applied till 30 September 2003. The fees for transport will 
be calculated on a point-to-point basis. A flat fee will apply for three 
transport zones at the regional distribution level and for transport by each 
local network. The fee will incorporate the costs of system services and 
limited road flexibility. Services for storage facilities will however be 
charged separately. However, since the concerned associations have not 
been able to agree on the access system and negotiations for VV Natural 
Gas III have broken down, the “Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und 
Arbeit” has started formulating access conditions, which will enter into 
force on 1 July 2004. 
 
With respect to the unbundling of accounts, the German legislator does not 
seem to go beyond the minimum requirements of the EC Gas Directive 
1998: the unbundling of accounts is prescribed. Articles 21 and 22 of the 
Gas Directive 1998 prescribe the designation of a competent authority. In 
Germany, this task is taken on by the Bundeskartellamt, which will function 
as the dispute settlement authority.  Access issues can be referred to the 
Federal Cartel Office, but only in so far as the competition law is effected. 
Other supervisory bodies for gas in Germany exist: the VV foresees in a 
dispute settlement procedure run by signing parties, and the Länder are 
equipped with supervisory bodies which are responsible for the supervision 
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of the companies. However, at the moment no gas regulator exists as is 
common in many of the other Member States. The Energy Industry Act 
1998 does not foresee in PSOs. With regard to access to its up-stream 
pipelines, Germany applies Article 23 (which states the conditions for 
access) of the Gas Directive 1998. In Germany everyone may build and sell 
storage capacity and this has lead to the existence of a storage market. 
Access to storage is very limited and is only allowed when capacity is 
available or when such access is technically necessary for an efficient access 
to the system. 
 
On 14 February 2003, the European Commission lodged an application at 
the ECJ concerning the failure of Germany to fulfil its obligations according 
to Directive 98/30/EC on common rules for the market of natural gas.
223
 
Germany had failed to transpose into national law provisions of the 
Directive and had only partially transposed other provisions of the Directive 
before the implementation deadline on 10 August 2000. On the date of the 
judgement of the ECJ, 1 April 2004, Germany had already published the 
provisions necessary to ensure full implementation of the Directive (the 
corresponding provisions had been published on 23 May 2003). However, 
the ECJ stated that it was settled case-law that “the question whether a 
Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations must be determined by 
reference to the situation prevailing in the Member State at the end of the 
period laid down in the reasoned opinion and that the Court cannot take 
account of any subsequent changes (see, inter alia, Case C-63/02 
Commission v United Kingdom [2003] ECR I-821, paragraph 11.” In its 
judgement, the ECJ thus merely established that Germany had failed to 
fulfil its obligations, but the judgement had no further consequences for 
Germany. 
6.3.3 Implementation of EC Gas Directive 2003 
The lack of full legal unbundling between transportation and supply within 
undertakings is often one of the main obstacles to non-discriminatory 
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network and a source for abuse of dominant positions. In the absence of full 
unbundling and structural changes, a regulatory regime will need to provide 
strong conduct regulation in order to ensure non-discrimination. The access 
to storage and associated flexibility services is essential for an efficient, 
non-discriminatory and cost-effective access to the network, and for 
ensuring a level-playing field. The German legislative structure did not 
provide for such unbundling or regulatory authorities. With the entry into 
force of the Gas Directive 2003, the German government has had to develop 
a new proposal for a Gas law, which would take into account the obligations 
incorporated in the new European Directive 2003. As such, the 
Bundeskabinett has drafted the “Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur 
Neuregelung des Energiewirtschaftsrechts” (28.07.2004).  This new 
proposal will implement EC Gas Directive 2003. The main provisions of the 
new law are the provisions on legal unbundling of the system operators. The 
new law defines clear unbundling conditions which will ensure that cross-
subsidisation cannot occur. Accordingly, distribution companies with more 
than 100.000 customers will have to legally unbundle as from 1 July 2007. 
Distribution system operators with less than 100.000 customers are exempt 
of the legal and organisational unbundling. The new act contains a new 
possibility for complaints. Furthermore, a new regulatory authority will be 
established. The Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post 
(RegTP – Federal regulatory authority for telecommunications and postal 
services) will take on the task of surveillance as to the liberalisation of the 
gas market in accordance with the EC Gas Directive 2003. The RegTP will 
be renamed: “Bundesregulierungsbehörde für Elektrizität, Gas, 
Telekommunikation und Post” (Federal Regulatory authority for electricity, 
gas, telecommunications and postal services). The new regulatory authority 
will guarantee non-discriminatory and efficient access to the network, such 
that Germany will be able to compete with other European markets, where 
prices have been much lower.  
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6.3.4 Changes and welfare effects on the German gas market 
In Germany, access to the grid and access to storage facilities has been a 
major obstacle. The handling of access requests is a rigid and bureaucratic 
process and the requests are often not processed on time. Clear information 
about bottlenecks and the availability of capacity is lacking. With respect to 
transmission tariffs, the network access procedure and payment system is 
much too sophisticated, and dependent upon the distance travelled and the 
diameter of the pipeline. Furthermore the charges are very high. 
Liberalisation is hindered by the lack of rules on TPA charges, just basic 
guidelines exist, with no enforcement mechanism or clear rules of 
application. In these uncertain conditions, the strong bargaining powers of 
incumbents like Ruhrgas and RWE relative to new entrants in transmission 
and supply of natural gas has to be called into question. It seems as if 
Germany’s largest supplier will not open the grids for TPA before 2007, 
raising barriers to entry. Due to the financial and supply links which many 
gas undertakings have with the larger transmission companies such as 
Ruhrgas, numerous undertakings are reluctant to supply directly or 
indirectly in the regions supplied by these larger companies. In addition, the 
absence of a regulatory body which can advise potential entrant on 
procedural matters and assist in the resolution of companies, hinders 
entrance.  
 
Prices reductions due to actual switching and the threat of switching have 
been very modest.
224
 The links between producers and gas buyers / 
importers are common in Germany. However, some state-owned 
Scandinavian (HEW, Wesertal Ems) and French companies (enBW and 
GASAG) have been able to enter the German gas market through 
acquisitions, e.g. buying into power companies, distributors and other large 
gas companies. Eligible customers expect lower prices, and in February 
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2001 the main operator (Ruhrgas) finally reduced prices for major 
customers by 10%. 
 
In a recent press release of 22 December 2004, the German Federal Cartel 
Authority has stated that it will initiate proceedings against five large 
German gas suppliers as they seem to abuse their dominant position by 
charging excessive gas prices. It concerns the RWE, MVV Energie 
(Stadtwerke Mannheim), SWU (Stadtwerke Ulm), Thüga (E.On, Allgäu-
Oberschwaben) and EnBW Ostbadenwürttemberg. The Federal Cartel 
Authority does not exclude the possibility of further investigations into the 
abuse of their positions. The Federal Cartel Authority has already initiated 
proceedings against 16 other gas supply undertakings, under which 
E.ON/Rurhgas, RWE, Wingas and VNG. These undertakings seem to have 
divided the market through the conclusion of long term supply agreements 
with one of the few gas importing companies. As such, entrance to the 
market is substantially restricted. 
 
Despite legal liberalisation, the German gas market de facto impedes 
competition. The publication of tariffs and clear rules on TPA, in addition to 
the establishment of a regulatory authority may be the first steps towards a 
real competitive market. 
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7 The overall effects of market liberalisation in the respective 
Member States 
Following the entry into force of the first EC Directive on common rules for 
an internal gas market in 1998, The Netherlands (September 1999) and 
Belgium (April 1999) had fully transposed the respective directive (with 
Belgium awaiting the implementing decrees) into national legislation by 10 
August 2000. Germany (Gas Act 1998, not based upon the EC Gas 
Directive 1998) lacked a national legal status of the directive. The Gas 
Directive 1998 required market opening to amount to 20% as from 10 
August 2000 and 33% by 2008. The Member States could opt to limit 
market opening by initially 30% and the increase this to 43% in 2004. On 
average 79% of total EU gas demand was eligible by 10 August 2000, and 
expected to increase to 92% by 2008. In 2000 Germany already had a 
market opening of 100%, Belgium followed with 47%, and The Netherlands 
with 45%.
225
 In 2002, The Netherlands had an market open amounting to 
60% and Belgium to 58%. The estimated percentage of market opening at 
that time for 2004 was 100% in The Netherlands and 83% in Belgium, with 
100% of the Belgium market becoming fully open to competition in 
2006.
226
 In 2004, 61% of customers has indicated to be aware of the opening 
of markets to competition. However, a large part of the customers fear that 
the quality and choice of services might suffer from the changes. In 
addition, customers would like to see full transparency of conditions and 
prices and supervision of the sector by a regulatory body.
227
 
 
Liberalisation is based upon the thought that the introduction of competition 
will lead to enhance social welfare, more specifically direct benefits will 
accrue to consumers as the existent monopolies are inefficient or yield 
monopoly gains to the detriment of the former. The main parameter through 
which the increase in consumer welfare can be measured is price. In 
                                                 
225
European Commission, Commission staff working paper (2001), Completing the internal 
energy market, SEC(2001) 438. 
226
 European Commission, Directorate General for Transport and Energy (2002), 
Completing the internal energy market, power point presentation. 
227
 European Commission, DG TREN Draft working paper: Third benchmarking report on 
the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market, 01.03.2004, p. 1-44. 
 97 
addition important parameters are the quality of the service,  the publication 
of conditions, consumer willingness to pay and consumer surplus. If the 
price decrease is indeed caused by direct efficiency gains is however 
difficult to measure, as diverse other factors exert an influence on the price 
level of gas.
228
 First of all, the international gas price, such as charged by 
producers, is established on the international market. Secondly, the gas price 
is correlated to the oil (predominantly) and dollar price.  Furthermore, the 
gas price charged to final customers is dependent upon transport and other 
related services offered by the respective natural gas undertakings. 
However, in afore mentioned areas one may expect better service and a 
price decrease as a result of the liberalisation process; increased competition 
will lead to cost efficiency and pressure the profit margins. In some Member 
States, environmental taxes may also influence the prices of natural gas. In 
the following paragraphs however, an attempt will be made to measure the 
increased welfare (amongst others) by the change in the price levels of gas. 
 
Statistics from 1997 clearly demonstrate that the average natural gas price in 
Continental Europe exceeds the average natural gas price in liberalised 
countries such as the US and UK.  As mentioned in the aforementioned 
paragraphs, the price difference is partly due to the low US tax regime and 
the country specific factors, such as the larger amount of smaller producers, 
and the lower development and transport costs in the US.
229
 However, one 
may conclude that since the markets in the US and UK have been 
liberalised, the gas price has adjusted correspondingly. The overall price 
differences with respect to the smaller consumers appear larger when 
comparing liberalised with non-liberalised countries. If we compare the 
natural gas prices for industry customers of the Member States of January 
1998, with the gas prices of July 2000. the prices seem to have increased 
(instead of the expected decrease) after liberalisation has been initiated. The 
gas price in Belgium in July 2000 (VAT and energy taxes excluded) 
amounts to an estimated 4,5 Eurocents per Gigajoule (GJ), in Germany to 
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5,1 Eurocents per GJ and in the Netherlands only 2,9 Eurocents per GJ. The 
average industry gas price is estimated to be 4,4 Eurocents per GJ. The only 
country which shows a price decrease is the Netherlands, which is a gas 
producing country. The price increase is however, largely due to a strong 
increase in the oil price.
230
 Account however, must be taken of the UK, 
which is a liberalised market and shows no fluctuation at all in price. It does 
become clear from the graph, that a large disparity still exits between the 
gas prices of the different Member States, irrespective of the gradual market 
opening. In 2002, prices seem to have risen even further, with the average 
industry gas price amounting to an estimated 5 Eurocents per GJ. The 
industry purchase price of gas in Belgium is estimated at 4,9 Eurocents per 
GJ, in Germany 6,8 Eurocents per GJ (no industry price indication is 
available for the Netherlands). The prices charged for domestic (gas prices 
charged to smaller customers and thus mainly households) gas are 
significantly higher than the prices charged to the industries. The average 
domestic gas price amounts to +/- 9,2 Eurocents per GJ. The domestic gas 
price in January 2002 for Belgium is 10 Eurocents per GJ, the German 
domestic gas price is 10,5 Eurocents per GJ and the Dutch domestic gas 
price is 8,5 Eurocents per GJ (no other domestic gas prices in Eurocents per 
GJ were available for comparison). In general, the gas prices for industrial 
users seem to have risen. However the actual effect is difficult to assess due 
to the increasing oil price for which the data actually has to be corrected, but 
this lies beyond the scope of this paper. Another indicator of the positive 
effects of liberalisation with respect to prices, is the price disparity between 
Member States. When the disparities become smaller, this may be due to the 
establishment of a level playing field and increased cross-border trade and 
competition. When assessing the natural gas prices charged to industrial 
users, it becomes apparent that the large discrepancies in the prices between 
the Member States have indeed decreased. In January 1998, the price 
discrepancy amounted to an estimated 3,8 Eurocents per GJ (Luxembourg: 
5,9 Eurocents per GJ and Denmark: 2,1 Eurocents per GJ), in January 2000 
this had been reduced to a difference of 2 Eurocents per GJ (Luxembourg: 
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4,9 Eurocents per GJ and The Netherlands: 2,9 Eurocents per GJ) and in 
January 2002 the difference was only 1,7 Eurocents per GJ (Denmark: 4 
Eurocents per GJ and Germany: 5,7 Eurocents per GJ). On average, since 
July 2000, the price levels for industrial users in Belgium have been 
medium and falling, and in Germany stable and high. The price levels for 
small commercial users have been medium and falling in Belgium, and 
medium and stable in Germany. Prices for households have been stable and 
high in Belgium, medium and stable in Germany and medium and rising in 
the Netherlands. Prices to large users have fallen in almost all countries 
since 2000.
231
 This is partly due to a reduction in the oil, but may also be 
due to increasing gas to gas competition in this end of the market. One may 
conclude that the natural gas prices do indicated positive effects of 
liberalisation. The DG TREN working paper of 1 March 2004
232
 reports that 
improved tariff structures have been recorded when the prices are adjusted 
for the swings in the crude oil price. Due to changing prices, 5% of the large 
eligible industrial users switched supplier in Germany in 2002 and 15% 
switched in The Netherlands. The switch made by small commercial and 
domestic customers was less than 2% in Belgium and The Netherlands. 
Neither Belgium and Germany nor The Netherlands apply end user price 
controls and have no special tariffs for vulnerable customers.
233
 
 
An important factor which measures the degree of successful liberalisation 
is the extend to which the liberalisation measures which have been issued, 
have actually been implemented. In this light the degree of TPA, which will 
increase competition on the network and hence pressure the incumbents and 
market prices, is important. Significant is also the overall amount of new 
entrants into the market in the different Member States. In August 2000, the 
increase in the gas carried by third parties as a percentage of the total gas 
carried on the network amounted to 1,5% in Germany, 2,5% in Belgium and 
8% in The Netherlands (highest of the Member States).
234
 In March 2001 
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TPA in the Netherlands amounted to 17%,  in Belgium to 2,5% and in 
Germany to 2%.
235
 Since August 2000 the number of new entrants on the 
Dutch market amount to 4, in Belgium 1 and in Germany 7. However, in 
2000 a large percent of buyers in both Belgium and The Netherlands (75%) 
feel that there is too little competition. In Germany this is slightly less with 
50% of the buyers dissatisfied with the amount of competition on the 
market.
236
 The main obstacles to competition in 2000 are the inadequate or 
ineffective unbundling, the high level of transportation and packaging costs, 
the daily balancing, the degree of access to the local grids, the lack of direct 
availability of storage, the high amount of medium and long-term contracts 
into which clients are locked, the poor disclosure of logistic information and 
the lack of new sources of gas. In addition, access to the market is blocked 
partially by the extensive amount of vertical integration linking on the one 
hand production interests (Belgium: Shell holds a minority stake in 
Distrigas; Germany: Shell and Esso hold shares in BEB, Rurhgas and 
Thyssengas respectively; The Netherlands: Shell and Esso hold stakes in 
NAM and Gasunie) and on the other hand incumbents (predominantly 
transmission undertakings) and distributors (Belgium: the ultimate 
shareholder of Distrigas, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, has strong interests in 
distributors; Germany: Ruhrgas has minority interests in regional companies 
and distributors, RWE+GAS and E.On even cover the whole chain, 
including small productions interest).
237
 In 2002, restrictions to competition 
remained. Major problems to the functioning of cross border trade were the 
lack of harmonisation with respect to the tariff structures  and the 
correspondingly high tariffs, the non-transparent methods for allocation of 
capacity, which is in general not based upon the market mechanisms. 
Furthermore the lack of interconnection and the existence of dominant 
market players restrains competitive activity.
238
  
 
In 2004, the number of active licensed suppliers in The Netherlands 
amounted to 24, and to 770 in Germany. The number of suppliers which 
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operated independently of the distribution system operator amounted to 12 
in Germany, and to 5 in Belgium. The number of suppliers with a market 
share larger than 5% in the respective markets amount to 5 in Belgium, 1 in 
Germany and 4 in The Netherlands, The top suppliers have an overall 
market share of 39% in Belgium, and 6% in Germany. The market share of 
the top three suppliers in Germany is less than 15%, in Belgium 54% and in 
the Netherlands 75%.
239
 This indicates a large amount of market 
concentration. In 2004, the competition within the European gas sector still 
tags behind the liberalisation effects which are visible in the electricity 
market. There is a need for greater consistency for transactions between 
different transmission system operators. Some improvements have been 
made concerning transparency as regards the availability of infrastructure 
capacity, as most transmission system operators presently publish this 
information. However, the publication of available capacity at the most 
relevant entry and exit points still needs to be accomplished in many 
Member States. Non-discriminatory and transparent TPA and access to 
storage thus remain problematic as provisions regulating these issues have 
not been correctly implemented in all Member States. A harmonised 
methodology to calculate and compare available capacities is also missing. 
Even though capacity reservation procedures are more flexible and 
responsive to clients for TPA and balancing regimes have been improved, 
effective harmonization is still lacking. In most Member States unbundling 
of transmission system operators has occurred by 2004 (Germany and 
Netherlands: management and Belgium: legal), as well as the unbundling of 
distribution system operators (Germany: accounts, Belgium: legal and The 
Netherlands: legal). In Belgium and The Netherlands network access 
conditions have been published by the regulatory authority, whilst in 
Germany network access conditions remain unregulated (this must change 
in accordance with the new EC Gas Directive 2004). In both Belgium and 
The Netherlands information powers are strong.
240
 However, the 
competition is still obstructed through the continuing dominance of 
incumbent companies in some Member States. A better management of the 
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EU network might reduce problems the of the concentration of gas 
production and import and permit more competition. However, in order to 
achieve this, harmonised solutions on cross border issues must be applied.
241
 
 
According to Eurobarometer Reports for Consumers (domestic users of the 
gas system, e.g. households), in September 2000,
242
 74% of the consumers 
replied that access to services of general interest within the EU was easily 
obtained, whilst 11,5% had no access to such services. 70% of the surveyed 
group indicated that they were satisfied with the provision of gas and 54,8% 
indicated to be satisfied with the price of gas, and 86,4% was satisfied with 
the quality of services relating to the gas sector. More specifically, 65% was 
happy with the information they received and 61% was satisfied with the 
contracts concluded with the providers of gas. In new surveys conducted in 
both August and October of 2003
243
, access to gas supply services was 
experienced as easy (ease of access means seeing a connection at the 
moment that this becomes technically feasible), at least by customers who 
lived in the area served by the gas network.  The price of gas is considered 
as fair by the majority of the customers in the Member States, except Italy. 
This is partly due to the fact that the image of gas as a relatively low priced 
energy source is widespread. The information supplied by the gas supplier is 
generally rated as clear, however this information is limited to bills and 
price conditions. The terms and conditions of the contract remain vague in 
the eyes of many customers and are rarely understood. Customer service is 
rated as fairly good. However, the interest in having the choice of supplier 
seems less important in the gas sector than in the electricity sector. Again 
this may be related to the fact that gas is perceived as a cheap energy source, 
whilst the possibility to achieve savings on electricity are perceived to be 
higher. 
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8 Conclusion 
The goal of liberalisation is to eliminate market imperfections, introduce 
competition and correspondingly lower prices. Whilst gas markets were 
historically regulated due to their network characteristics, technological 
change has induced competition in parts of these markets, specifically in the 
areas of distribution and supply. 
 
At the time of writing, December 2004, the Community has come a long 
way with respect to the liberalisation of the gas markets. From the first steps 
towards a common Community Energy Policy in 1951 with the 
establishment of the ECSC, to the entry into force of EC Gas Directive 1998 
and 2003, till the recent proposal for a Regulation on the conditions for 
access to the gas transmission networks.
244
 It can be stated without doubt 
that liberalisation has made its entry at last into the gas sector. Whilst the 
transmission, supply and distribution of gas was formerly the exclusive 
domain of vertically integrated natural gas companies undertaken with the 
objective of securing the market, liberalisation measures have opened the 
market up to new entrants. Problems of course remain, and measures will 
have to be constantly improved, as has already been shown by the entry into 
force of a revised Gas Directive. Coherent technical and commercial trading 
rules for the operation of gas networks, TPA, legal unbundling, transparent 
and non-discriminatory tariffs, as well as the interoperability of gas network 
systems remain important. The Commission will continue to direct its focus 
on the gas markets. 
 
Has liberalisation had the desired increase on consumer welfare? This 
remains difficult to assess. Welfare effects are important for both industrial 
customers and domestic end-users, which in the light of the gas market may 
both be characterised a consumers. Most of the data which is presently 
available relates to the period 2000-2002/2003, when the Gas Directive 
2003 was not yet been implemented. In addition, most data refers to 
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 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions 
for access to the gas transmission networks, 10.12.2003, COM(2003). 
 104 
industrial users. It is not strange that the welfare effects for domestic 
customers are difficult to assess, as these have just become eligible in 
Member States, with full market opening obliged in all Member States as of 
1 July 2004. Correspondingly, households have only begun to reap the 
benefits of liberalisation.  
 
The parameters which might indicate an increase in consumer welfare are 
prices, TPA, and the introduction of a larger choice of suppliers, in addition 
to transparent tariffs and conditions of supply. The gas prices on the market 
for natural gas do not indicate a significant decrease since liberalisation.  
This is however, partly due to the rising oil prices. The price discrepancies 
between Member States have seemed to decrease, which may indicate a 
positive effect on liberalisation, and an increase in welfare, as prices will 
continue to adjust and balance each other out. The fact that numerous 
suppliers have been able to enter the markets, pressures incumbent 
monopolists to reduce their prices and operate in a cost efficient way. The 
increase in suppliers in the market also means that customers have a larger 
choice in choosing their gas suppliers. With regard to TPA, access 
conditions remain difficult in some Member States. The obliged designation 
of a regulatory authority as prescribed by the new Gas Directive 2003 aids 
in securing TPA. 
 
Regardless of the opinions polled by the Eurobarometer, consumers regard 
supplier contracts to be unclear. Member States must aim to increase the 
quality of these contracts. Gas Directive 2003 incorporates provision 
(Article 3) on consumer protection. Accordingly The Netherlands have 
already, implemented this obligation by incorporating in the new Gas Act 
2004 a special provision on consumer protection which aims to ensure that 
fair and reliable contracts are concluded between consumers and the 
suppliers of gas. 
 
With full liberalisation finally achieved on 1 July 2004, further development 
of the gas markets and the effects on welfare are expected. Markets are 
continually changing and I am anxious to see as to whether in the coming 
 105 
years, we will be comparing gas prices of suppliers in order to conclude a 
contract with the supplier offering the best conditions and tariffs. 
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